How to Weaken Executive Accountability: Trump v United States

Monaghan, Chris ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9331-804X (2024) How to Weaken Executive Accountability: Trump v United States. Judicial Review. pp. 1-12. ISSN Print: 1085-4681; Electronic: 1757-8434

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Abstract

Accountability of those holding executive power is vital to ensure good government, respect of legal and constitutional principles, and public faith in the political culture of the state. The mechanisms developed to achieve accountability must also be fair, effective, and have legitimacy. As Elbridge Gerry said during the debate at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, he wished that a “maxim would never be adopted here that the chief magistrate can do no wrong.” That was the rationale for the inclusion of impeachment within the US Constitution. This article will argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v United States is misguided and offers a broad immunity to a former President of the United States, an immunity that will erode accountability, and reduce the deterrent of the ordinary courts once the President has left office.

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