Paternalism, Conflict and Decline: The seventh Marquess of Londonderry and the Coal Industry, 1906–1947

N.C. Fleming

Generations of miners toiled underground as employees of the Londonderry Collieries Limited. The hard grind of their labour, and the conditions in which they lived, were in stark contrast to the grandeur of Wynyard Hall and the lifestyle of its famous residents, the Londonderry family. It is hardly surprising then that popular folklore in County Durham has tended to cast the latter in a negative light. Much of that was forged in the era of the third Marquess of Londonderry.[1] He had acquired his interest through marriage in 1819 to Frances Anne Vane-Tempest, heir to her family's vast coalfield in east Durham. Almost a century later, on 8 February 1915, it was inherited from the sixth Marquess by his thirty-six-year-old son, Charles Stewart Henry Vane-Tempest-Stewart. The seventh Marquess would be the last of his line to have an active role in the coal trade—he narrowly outlived the nationalisation of his collieries in 1947—and that denouement inevitably weighs on any assessment of his stewardship of the company in its final decades, and in particular, his relationship with its employees.

Londonderry and his wife, Edith, have received a significant amount of attention in print.[2] In the overwhelming majority of these works, the coal trade is a peripheral or background feature. The result in several cases is a disposition to draw inferences. In her study of the Marchioness of Londonderry as a political hostess, Susan Williams asserts that her subject's creation of the Personal Service League in 1932, to help people in distressed areas, demonstrated 'charitable intentions which were markedly absent from her husband's approach to the poor.'[3] Even Lord Londonderry's granddaughter, Annabel Goldsmith, claims that her father, the eighth Marquess, 'distinguished himself by bothering to take time down the mines himself, something that many

previous Castlereaghs and Londonderrys, including his own father, had failed to do.'[4] As examined below, not only is Williams' claim open to question, Goldsmith's is simply incorrect.

The seventh Marquess's connection to the coal trade has not gone completely unnoticed. There are glimpses of his behind-the-scenes role in the 1926 general strike in celebrated accounts by Julian Symons and Margaret Morris, and the published diaries of Thomas Jones.[5] And his reputation as a colliery owner is touched upon in studies of County Durham by Pauline Lynn, Huw Beynon and Terry Austrin, and Hester Barron.[6] In these works, Londonderry is invoked as an example of the persistence of bonds of paternalism between colliery owners and miners in the trying circumstances of the inter-war period. Lynn goes as far as arguing that Londonderry remained 'extremely influential' and 'tremendously powerful' in east Durham, and that his use of paternalism was part of a strategy to break the Labour movement.[7] This article builds on that scholarship by examining Londonderry's complex, shifting, and contradictory attitudes to trade unionism, fellow colliery owners, and the role of government.

I

1919 was a pivotal year in shaping Londonderry's attitude to the coal trade. Before that, there was nothing to distinguish him from the owners' representative body, the Mining Association of Great Britain (MAGB). This is evident from his time as the Conservative MP for Maidstone (1906–15), when he addressed the House of Commons on a succession of Liberal government measures that sought to address the working conditions of miners. Known then by his courtesy title, Viscount Castlereagh, he invoked the principle of economic freedom to defend the status quo. He applied this not only to justify the rights of owners, but also those of the miners, that they might work as many hours as they chose, and working-class consumers, so that they could purchase their household fuel at the most affordable cost.[8] Notwithstanding the obvious self-interest of his line of reasoning, it is noticeable that he took care in his parliamentary interventions to avoid appearing to criticise his employees. He did so by regarding the miners as

individuals exercising free choice, and by overlooking the fact that the driving force for reform came from the miners' trade union representatives, the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB). The union's leaders, by his reckoning, were troublemaking agitators. Yet, for all his emphasis on individual freedom, Londonderry still expected the miners to place the success of the industry above their own concerns.[9] He appears, at this stage, to have assumed that the owners did just that, in so far as he denied the criticism that they were motivated solely by profit, and that they did not care about the miners' safety.[10]

Rising industrial unrest in the coal industry and the government's inclination to respond with legislation were unsettling developments for the owners. Even if Liberal ministers were reluctant to impose national pay bargaining, thus leaving in place the local arrangements held sacrosanct by the MAGB, the owners were still on the defensive. It became a fixed posture after 1913 as the industry's long-term problems became more apparent, that is, its chronically excess capacity and the resulting extreme stagnation in demand. The Durham coalfield's reliance on the export market meant that it was particularly hard hit in the years that followed.[11] The owners at first clung to the belief that it was another temporary difficulty, one that could be conveniently explained by increasing MFGB militancy and legislative interventions. The MFGB, in contrast, blamed the industry's problems on the owners and managers, and it called for the industry to be made more efficient through nationalization. In his study of the decline of the British coal industry, Barry Supple argues that its problems were more profound than the question of ownership and management, but that its difficulties were exacerbated by the habits and prejudices of its owners and managers, and that as a result the blame for its problems was more often than not laid at their door.[12] That mattered politically because the industry employed around 1,250,000 people immediately after the First World War, and its highly unionised workforce produced something that was consumed directly and indirectly by the entire population.

This is the backdrop against which Londonderry came to question the wisdom of MAGB orthodoxy. The more immediate stimulus was the establishment in February 1919 of the royal commission on the coal industry, chaired by Sir John Sankey. Wartime government controls had remained in place after the armistice, and it was the prospect of a national miners' strike over wages that led the government—a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives—to establish the Sankey commission. It was made up of three colliery owners, three miners' leaders, three industrialists, and three economists. Londonderry was summoned to give evidence on 8 May. Under cross examination, he revealed that he was 'the owner of minerals already proved to exist under about 5,808 acres in the County of Durham.' That, aside from four shares of £100 each, he was the sole shareholder of the Londonderry Collieries, which included three collieries in and around Seaham: Seaham itself, purchased by Frances Anne, Marchioness of Londonderry in 1849; Silksworth, sunk by the fifth Marquess in 1872 and now held under lease; and Dawdon, sunk by the sixth Marquess between 1900 and 1906. He employed a total of seven thousand men and boys. His average annual output was 546,720 tons, around half of which was worked by lessee companies. The royalties paid to him were fixed to tonnage, the average being 4½ d. per ton, totalling £9,608 annually. A further £5,726 was paid each year to Londonderry for way-leaves. He admitted under questioning that he would use his membership of the House of Lords to block reforms to the industry if he felt that it was in the interests of his company.[13] The answer was consistent with his record in the House of Commons, but it was all the more noteworthy because he had recently joined the coalition government as Finance Member of the Air Council.

The Sankey commission's hearings drew attention to the highly fragmented and scattered structure of the coal industry, in which around three thousand pits were owned by 1,500 companies or individuals, and more controversially, that royalties for coal brought to the surface were paid to four thousand landowners. It also highlighted the dire living conditions of miners and their families. In its recommendations, the commission called for wage rises and seven-hour

working days, but it was divided on nationalization. The commissioners could agree that coal itself should be nationalized, but they were divided equally on nationalizing the collieries, thus requiring Sankey to cast his vote in favour. The coalition government was not inclined to implement such a profound change, especially given the industry's worsening economic performance, and so the commission's equivocation on nationalization provided ministers with the pretext to do nothing. The result was that moderates in the MFGB were undermined and the owners demanded that the industry be freed from the shackles of government interference.[14] The heightening tension that resulted was experienced by Londonderry directly when he visited the Easington Colliery in August 1919, to present a site for a memorial club to the Easington branch of the Comrades of the Great War. The inclusion in his speech of a call to increase production would have been provocative even in less testing times, but in the wake of Sankey it caused his audience to make constant interruptions, obliging him 'to resume his seat for some time.'[15]

It was in the period between the Sankey commission and 1 April 1921, when the government planned to hand back control of the mines to the owners, that Londonderry's outlook underwent a noticeable change. It is first apparent in an address that he gave to the Seaham Colliery Conservative Club on 19 December 1919: 'The employers realized that the first consideration was the welfare of the workers. Cooperation for the benefit of all concerned was now the idea.' He warmed to his theme. 'The drawback to any industry was the element of suspicion. There were some people who thought that between employer and employed there was a chasm which it was impossible to bridge. He thought that that chasm did not exist, and that if it did the great majority of our people were anxious and willing to bridge it.'[16] Vague words, to be sure, but the sentiment was new for him, and it would be given greater substance in the years that followed. In the meantime, Londonderry reduced his exposure to the industry's problems by divesting himself of Silksworth, transferring it—along with its two thousand employees and their houses—in September 1920 to the Lambton and Hetton Collieries.[17]

The restoration of the collieries to the owners on 1 April 1921 was marked by a national strike in protest against the lower wages that were imposed as a consequence. The miners remained on strike for three months, despite losing the support of the other major unions on 15 April. In the intervening time, Londonderry made a public intervention that signalled his willingness to dissent from the MAGB. Writing to *The Times*, he urged everyone in the national interest to reach a solution. 'It must be obvious to all that our present methods of production and distribution in the coal industry are antiquated and require thorough revision, and it is quite impossible that such a revision can take place without the sympathetic cooperation of all concerned.' After ruling out nationalization, he argued that the 'whole trend of modern commercial development is towards amalgamation and unification, and I can see no reason whatsoever why such a policy should not be adopted in the coal trade.' He concluded by claiming that most members of the MFGB were simply anxious about wages. The federation's resolutions, in contrast, were the result of unrepresentative 'extremists.' There could be no 'free expression of opinion of the miners', he reasoned, unless ballots were conducted in secret.[18] His intervention was met with indifference by the government and most owners. A neighbouring Durham owner, the first Baron Gainford, responded to Londonderry by dismissing amalgamations as inapplicable to 'the present situation', as it would take time to reduce the production costs. In any case, the former Liberal MP admitted, 'I have a strong personal dislike to all efforts made to secure in any trade a combine or trust.'[19] If there was any support for Londonderry on the MAGB, it was Gainford's view that ultimately prevailed, an outcome facilitated by the miners' humiliating defeat on 1 July, when they returned to work on lower wages based on district agreements, and the severe slump of that year, which had the effect of reducing industrial unrest.[20]

II

Trade unionism in the Durham coalfield was long established.[21] By the time that Londonderry inherited the family collieries, the Durham Miners' Association had become the best organised and most politically significant miners' union in the country.[22] It had gone some considerable way to unbinding the bonds of paternalism in pit-village life, stripping the employer-employee relationship to its economic core. It was also instrumental in developing the local Labour party whose main objective, according to Pauline Lynn, was 'to limit the Londonderry influence within the community', with the result that the Seaham constituency became a Labour stronghold in 1923.[23] The declining profitability of the Durham coalfield undoubtedly tested Londonderry's ability to resist this development. Just as he had divested himself of Silksworth in 1920, it was announced two years later that Seaham Hall—which had been acquired by his family a hundred years previously—would be closed and its contents sold, though the public would continue to have free use of the grounds.[24] These were financial decisions, however, the latter explained as the result of 'heavy taxation and cost of upkeep', and he followed them in 1923 with the sale of his house near Oakham in Rutland.[25] Londonderry had not repudiated the paternalistic role that he was expected to play in his employees' lives and communities. According to Beynon and Austrin, he managed to sustain it through the 'deeply masculine nature of club culture', and by continuing to 'fuse' his family's 'relationship with the miners through a deep sense of nationhood and populist ideals of democracy'. This was achieved by the active involvement of the Londonderrys and their agents in the local associational culture of political, religious, and secular organizations, including working men's clubs.[26]

In August 1919, a week after Lord Londonderry had been heckled, he entertained ten thousand invited miners from his collieries, and their wives, in the grounds of Seaham Hall. The stated purpose of the gathering—to celebrate 'the peace' and to present a number of ex-soldier employees with decorations for gallantry—did not see a repeat of the previous week's protests.[27] On 20 August 1922, several months after announcing the closure of Seaham Hall, Londonderry unveiled the war memorial erected at Seaham Harbour, and nearby, a week later, a statue of his

late father.[28] In December that year, he opened a new parish hall and institute at Dawdon Colliery.[29] The following July, he unveiled the war memorial at New Seaham, erected by the miners of Seaham Colliery to the 165 local men who fell in the First World War. An active supporter of the local branch of the Comrades of the Great War, established to counter the influence of socialist ex-servicemen's organizations, he remarked that the monument would serve as 'a reminder to generations to come that the real function of life was to be found in the selfless devotion of every one of them to the cause of duty, of humanity, and of the belief in Christian ethics.'[30] Weeks later, he opened a new pavilion at Dawdon Recreation Grounds at Seaham Harbour, which was presented to the miners of Dawdon Colliery.[31]

The bonds of paternalism between Londonderry and his employees were not confined to ceremonial unveilings and openings. In March 1920, Londonderry gifted a new stand, designed by his surveyor, to Seaham Harbour Football Club.[32] More significantly, in January 1923, he held out the possibility of a new pit being sunk in Seaham Harbour, informing a meeting there that he hoped that it 'would see a large addition to the community in a few years, with Seaham growing into one of the most influential towns in the North of England.'[33] Later in the year, he announced that he would build twenty houses—'of the three-roomed type, with scullery and bath-room'—at Dawdon and twenty at Seaham, for the purpose of selling to employees by hire purchase. In what was described as 'an experiment', the purchaser would pay a deposit of five pounds and would get the benefit of a government subsidy which was calculated at about £75 per house.[34] On 6 September, Londonderry descended the mines at both Dawdon and Seaham, accompanied by his wife and son; it was reported that lords Londonderry and Castlereagh wore pit suits and that Lady Londonderry had a mackintosh over her dress.[35] In May 1924 Lord Londonderry donated the land, bricks, and £100 towards the construction of twelve homes for aged miners at Dawdon, the bulk of the money having already been raised by the miners.[36] In November that year, he gifted twelve 'Castlereagh Aged Miners' Homes' to mark the recent

coming of age of his son; each of the occupants also received what was reported as 'a substantial sum' from Londonderry's sister, the Countess of Ilchester.[37]

III

The more peaceable conditions in the mining industry, and the prosperity that briefly returned in 1923, appear to have disinclined Londonderry from dissenting again from the MAGB's unbending resistance to change. On 1 December 1924, in an address to the Coal Trade Benevolent Fund attended by four hundred dinner guests, he offered the limp observation that if 'owners had freedom from interference and a continuance of friendly relations with their men he was sanguine that they would surmount those difficulties and that the British coal trade would flourish.'[38] However, as he acknowledged in his speech, the period of favourable conditions for the industry was coming to an end, largely as a result of the increased competition from Germany. As the crisis began to bite in the early months of 1925, many mines began running at a loss resulting in closures and rising unemployment. It was at this point that Londonderry recalled his earlier rhetoric by appealing for everyone to pull together and 'face the odds which they were up against.'[39] The crisis was compounded in April by the government's decision to return to the gold standard, thereby making British exports more expensive and less competitive. Predictably, the MAGB insisted on wage cuts and longer hours without offering a commensurate diminution in the owners' rate of profit.[40] In response, the MFGB, supported by the Trades Union Congress (TUC), rejected the owners' demands and called for nationalization. Fears grew of another national strike until the Conservative prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, intervened at the end of July with a nine-month subsidy and the establishment of a royal commission under Sir Herbert Samuel.

Speaking at his Welsh estate, Plâs Machynlleth, on 13 August, Londonderry praised Baldwin's 'high statesmanlike attitude' and contrasted it with the unions, 'to which they owed debts of gratitude for many reasons', but which 'had become dominated by minorities, who, with the

machinery and weapons they had at their disposal, were setting themselves up as the tyrants of the British race.' Referring to the MFGB's general secretary, A.J. Cook, he added 'that if it became an issue between Mr Cook and the British Government and the British nation they would find every right-thinking Labour man—and a great majority were right-thinking men—ranged on the side of the Government—not the Conservative Government, not the Liberal Government, but the Government of the country under his Majesty the King.'[41] Cook responded in kind. 'I notice that Lord Londonderry has joined with some of the Press in the country in its attack upon myself', he informed a meeting in Montgomeryshire. 'Surely this man should be the last to charge our people with fomenting revolution', he continued, in an obvious reference to Londonderry's association with Ulster Unionist militancy before the war. 'A close examination of his history, especially with regard to Ireland, will prove that Lord Londonderry has been the greatest fomentor of revolution in Great Britain, and, instead of him warning me, the British public will know what a danger he is to peace and security and happiness for the British working classes.'[42] Speaking afterwards at Durham, Londonderry addressed a demonstration of the Junior Imperial League on Baldwin's 'statesmanship' and 'courage', contrasting it with the 'arrogant and impudent assertion of power by what was a minority of the community – and, let them remember, a minority of the minority, because Mr Cook and his friends did not represent the great mass of trade unionism in this country … They represented Communists and Bolshevists.'[43]

These interventions aside, Londonderry chose not to comment publicly on the proceedings of the Samuel commission. He was nevertheless unhappy with its progress, and he signalled to Baldwin his dissent from the intransigent posture adopted by other owners. The MAGB had barely moved on from the Sankey commission in so far as it maintained that the industry's prosperity between 1873 and 1913 provided an adequate rebuttal to calls for nationalization, and that its problems were due to syndicalism and the deliberate restriction of output by miners.[44] Londonderry described the evidence given to the Samuel commission by his fellow County

Durham colliery owner, the eighth Duke of Northumberland, as 'very advantageous to Socialism'. 'The question which must be answered soon', Londonderry insisted to the prime minister, 'is how the cost of the production of coal can be reduced and the way it can be reduced is by a greater freedom from restrictions and by a larger output. In my opinion, there is no need to reduce wages, in fact I should be very sorry to see that happen. It would merely mean a reduction of purchasing capacity throughout a large section of the community.'[45] In public, however, Londonderry did not at first dissent from the MAGB line. In an address to the Seaham Harbour Constitutional Club published in the press on 9 January 1926, he said that the owners were better able to run their industry than 'politicians', and that 'their desires were to do everything in their power to make the industry a success, and he knew perfectly well that nine-tenths of the workmen were actuated by the same ideals.'[46]

The following evening, however, Londonderry betrayed a little of his private frustrations with fellow owners in an address to the annual dinner of the Dawdon Colliery Officials' Association. He waxed on the erosion of 'individuality' that had accompanied the transformation of small businesses into 'corporations', and on the need to 'march towards idealism' rather than 'towards materialism'; that 'it was the duty of those who were in authority, whether as owners or officials, to realize that they were dealing with human beings and not machines, and to extend to them that sympathy and understanding of their point of view and outlook to which they were justly entitled.'[47] He was more forthcoming, in contrast, about his dislike of Cook. On 11 January he rounded on the former syndicalist's recent assertion that the owners had exploited the miners during the war and that they continued to do so. 'A more discreditable misstatement was never made', Londonderry informed a meeting at New Seaham Conservative Club. 'It was Mr Cook and his friends who exploited the nation, because, whenever our Army was in a tight corner during the war, they held the country up to ransom by threats of strikes and cessation of supplies of coal.'[48]

It was only in the weeks that followed that Londonderry and other moderates emerged publicly from the ranks of the coal owners in an effort to diffuse the growing tension in industrial relations. Addressing a social gathering at Dawdon Working Men's Club on 22 January, he called for 'mutual understanding', and 'speaking for himself and many others he declared that owners did not believe that the prosperity of the industry depended on reducing wages or lengthening hours. At the present time America paid high wages and gave reasonable hours to those engaged in the coal industry, and the industry thrived.' At the same time, he warned against the idea that the restriction of output 'would secure more work for others … because what was wanted in this country was an abundance of output … in order to reduce working expenses.'[49] The speech was welcomed by the influential newspaper proprietor, the first Baron Beaverbrook, 'because the heads of the Coal Industry will want all the wise advice and statesmanship which they can get if they are to weather the storm.'[50] *The Times*'s labour correspondent was similarly positive. He observed that Londonderry's suggestions for a settlement, 'although tentative in character, are arousing a good deal of interest'. He had 'gone beyond the proposals of the Mining Association by suggesting that district negotiations and settlements might be subject to national agreements, and that if piece rates depended on district settlements it would not necessarily follow that earnings would be reduced.' It was reported that 'At first Mr A.J. Cook … was disposed to welcome Lord Londonderry's intervention as signifying a weakening of the forces represented by the Mining Association; but now—as if it were a family quarrel and a third party's endeavours to square a settlement were the last thing to be tolerated—Mr Cook refers Lord Londonderry to the Mining Association … that if Lord Londonderry has anything to put forward he should do it through that body.'[51]

On 27 January Baldwin addressed a ten-thousand strong crowd at Sunderland Stadium. That Londonderry presided at the meeting is unremarkable given that he was the head of the Conservative party in the county, yet his recent actions ensured that this did not compromise the prime minister's approach to handling the brewing crisis. Introducing Baldwin, Londonderry

addressed his own recent intervention. 'I have taken this decided step in the past few days because I feel that we are bound to follow the example which the prime minister gives us, and to do every single thing we can to stimulate the spirit and feeling of sympathy, fellowship and cooperation.' Baldwin in his speech explicitly endorsed what Londonderry had said, and appealed 'to those who have the destinies of that great trade in their hands not to play fast and loose with the employment of men in dependent trades.'[52] Little wonder that Londonderry's son, Lord Castlereagh—who was despatched to the United States to study its mining industry—noted that his 'father has now come out as the coal King and at the moment is the central figure in the picture'.[53]

Londonderry was given an advanced copy of the Samuel commission's report before its publication on 10 March.[54] It recommended amalgamations, for the purpose of making the industry more efficient, and that the complex system of royalties should be nationalized. It called for wages to be bargained on a national not district basis and a seven-hour working day. The report further recommended the construction of pit-head baths and of decent houses at new collieries. It was a clear repudiation of the intransigent position long adopted by most owners, but it disappointed the miners too with its refusal to support the industry's nationalization and its call for wage cuts as an immediate solution to its difficulties. Publication of the report did little to encourage compromise between the MAGB and the MFGB, even with the nine-month subsidy due to expire at the end of April. It did not help that the former took little heed of the moderate owners in its ranks. In fact, with the notable exception of Sir Alfred Mond, the association succeeded in pressing moderates into public silence. Nor was Baldwin prepared to coerce the owners. Londonderry was not involved directly in the negotiations between the association and the federation, but he felt that the deadlock between the two obliged the prime minister to intervene. 'I put this to you with all respect and humility', he informed Baldwin on 13 April, 'because we collectively, owners and men, have failed to do what I earnestly hoped and prayed we could do, which was to join together and work out a solution to the problem. If our failure is

due to deeper reasons than those which appear on the surface, it is for those outside the industry to diagnose the causes which are nullifying the best elements in the representatives of each side.'[55] The leading trade unionist and Labour MP, James Thomas, wrote the following day to Londonderry: 'The situation is very black at the moment … behind it all is the mistrust of each side for the other … I think you ought to … take a hand.'[56] Londonderry, however, was not yet prepared to break ranks decisively with fellow owners.

IV

The negotiations having broken down, the owners expected the miners to accept lower wages and longer hours. The MFGB refused and its members were locked out on 30 April. As a result, the government declared a state of emergency and the TUC's general council pledged its support for the miners and made plans for a general strike to include the railwaymen, dockers, road transport workers, printers, and gas and electricity workers. The combined action began in the early hours of 4 May following the breakdown of last-minute negotiations with ministers. One million striking miners were joined by two and a half million workers, an impressive display of solidarity, but it belied the TUC general council's lack of enthusiasm for the general strike and its unpreparedness for its consequences. Divisions quickly emerged between moderates on the general council and the miners' leaders. On the other side of the dispute, disagreements about strategy emerged between a section of moderate owners, including Londonderry, and the prime minister, who, in spite of his inclination to reach a settlement, did not want to appear to be negotiating during the strike. Nor did he want to press a particular settlement, preferring instead to appeal to the public for trust. As a result, Baldwin declined to inform his cabinet colleagues that Londonderry and one of Mond's managers had contacted him to express their unhappiness about the hard-line position of the MAGB.[57]

On 4 May Londonderry was one of several prominent politicians and churchmen to visit the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson, who was known to sympathize with the plight of

the strikers. Baldwin discouraged Davidson from making an immediate overture to end the strike, but he was persuaded to do otherwise by Londonderry, 'the one mine owner whom I have found to possess suggestiveness or resource is Londonderry, of whom I myself should hardly have expected it.'[58] However, the archbishop's appeal for a negotiated settlement was not as effective as it might have been, for the British Broadcasting Company refused to air it after coming under pressure from the government, and when it was published in the provincial and national press, it received a mixed reaction from politicians and clerics alike.[59] On 7 May Londonderry joined a deputation of ten major colliery owners, which also included Mond, to meet in secret with the prime minister with the purpose of promoting a compromise that was based on the report of the Samuel commission.

The TUC called off the general strike on 12 May after Thomas was contacted by Herbert Samuel and the two men discussed possible solutions, including an extension of the subsidy. Samuel, however, did not speak for the government and so the miners remained locked out whilst members of the other trade unions returned to work.[60] Londonderry wrote to the prime minister on 15 May to congratulate him on his 'wonderful achievement', and to welcome the fact that he had 'taken the coal dispute over.' Londonderry continued to support a compromise and advised that pressure would be needed if all sides were to give ground, and he offered his assistance should it be required.[61] It appears that Londonderry's offer was accepted, for he thereafter consulted with the Deputy Cabinet Secretary, Thomas Jones, and the result was a new settlement under the former's name, published in the *Colliery Guardian* in mid-June.[62]

As well as a national wages board and better conditions for the miners, Londonderry argued that the industry could only be returned to profitability if local pits were organized so that 'co-partnership and cooperation' existed between miners and owners. He suggested that the government could legislate to establish a national wages board, as well as pit-head baths and pit committees, the latter to be made up of 'owners and representatives of the men … which would go fully into the question of the reorganization of each particular undertaking.' He nevertheless

cautioned that under present conditions, mines that were not profitable could not be reopened as 'no one expected the miners to accept a lower standard of living.'[63] The Bishop of Durham, Herbert Henson, privately expressed to Londonderry his reluctance to take sides, 'But certainly what I understand to be your general position as a mine owner commends itself very strongly to me.' He urged Londonderry to get the miners' backing.[64] But contrary to the spirit of the bishop's advice, Londonderry did little to enamour himself to the MFGB. 'I have endeavoured to do whatever has lain in my power to bring about peace and to get the industry as a whole to understand in which direction lies ours and the nation's ultimate prosperity', he informed an audience at Belfast, shortly after the appearance of his proposed settlement in the *Colliery Guardian*, 'but I have been checkmated at every turn by the foolish utterances of Mr Cook.'[65]

Locally, the experience of Londonderry's employees and their families was not as hard as it was in west Durham, where a greater incidence of strikes and unemployment meant that people had fewer savings to draw upon. Moreover, the Londonderry Collieries were among the first in the area to recommence, on 7 May, the supply of free weekly loads of coal to its workmen.[66] But the undeniable hardships of the strike still provided fertile ground for controversy. In particular, Londonderry's preparedness to financially support the wives and children of miners became the subject of a bitter public row with Joseph Batey, the Labour MP for the Spennymoor division of Durham and a former official in the Durham Miners' Association.[67] In like manner, Londonderry took to the press in August after learning that the leader of the Labour party, Ramsay MacDonald, had been seeking aid in the United States for distressed mining families. Londonderry attacked this as propaganda and he invited MacDonald to inspect conditions at the Londonderry Collieries.[68] In a follow up letter to *The Times*, Londonderry listed what the miners' children ate in their two meals a day, advertised his company's welfare schemes, and reminded readers that his employees lived rent free in colliery houses and that they received a coal allowance.[69] Whatever his intentions, the letter's publication coincided with the MFGB's decision to enter negotiations unconditionally, a development that was in many ways a reaction to the

worsening conditions of many miners and their families. They were subsequently informed that the owners would not accept anything other than a complete surrender. Londonderry's defensiveness certainly appeared disagreeable in these circumstances, but it was not altogether without cause. As Hester Barron highlights, there was an awareness locally among miners that Londonderry was more enthusiastic and forthcoming in providing relief to their families than the Labour MP for Seaham, Sidney Webb. An anonymous interviewee even described him to a journalist as 'the ideal coal owner'.[70]

The Mining Industry Act 1926 gave legislative expression to elements of the Samuel commission's report. In the House of Lords, Londonderry described it as 'a permissive and temporary Bill' that 'only holds the ground so long as any one else has no better suggestion.'[71] Several months later he was invited to confer with his second cousin, Winston Churchill, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer sought a longer-term solution. Thomas Jones records in his diary how Churchill could be heard discussing the crisis 'from every conceivable angle ... walking the grounds [of Chartwell] with "Charley" Londonderry and owing to the echo his voice can be heard a quarter of a mile away.'[72] Having adopted a notoriously bellicose posture during the general strike, Churchill was now coming round to the view that it was the MAGB that was the real obstacle to a settlement.[73] He hoped that his cousin might persuade the owners to compromise, or at least offer information on their thinking. After their meeting at Chartwell, Londonderry wrote to the chancellor about his dealings with the MAGB. He had been able to carry it with him in accepting 'the Federation as a body which in some form was bound to be in existence, and we agreed that our district arrangement should be subject to the acceptance or rejection of the Federation, but not if we could help it to variation by the Federation. That means that wages, loans and conditions of working should be district arrangements and that other matters should be for the Federation to discuss and arrange with the Association.' Londonderry then addressed the question of nationalization: 'they could accept a national agreement which allowed for the working at a profit of the poorest district … The great point

for the district settlements which is being lost sight of is that a trivial local dispute would not have the effect of holding the country up to ransom.' He counselled Churchill that 'if the Federation … are judiciously handled' then its leaders 'will be only too glad to climb out on the bare recognition of the Miners Federation, but if you give them the smallest inkling that your mind is moving from the equilibrium away from the owners' side of the table even by a hair's breath then they will fight like tigers for the National agreement and nothing but the National agreement.'[74]

As his advice suggests, Londonderry feared that Churchill was indeed tilting away from the owners. He complained to the prime minister on 12 September that the chancellor's 'efforts appeared in my judgement to follow on the lines of Cook['s] desires … I am fearful of any buttressing of [him] even in the earnest desire of paying that price to end the strike. I know Winston has gone strenuously and whole heartedly and loyally to put an end to this deadlock, but Winston has never been a good doctor: he has all the attributes of the Quack and his training under [David] L[loyd]G[eorge] was disastrous.' In the same letter, Londonderry acknowledged that the 'strategy of the owners has not been very good and rightly I suppose they are very jealous of interference, and like running their own show', but he still maintained that the 'principle on which their contentions are based is a sound one from our political point of view as the Federation is dead against us politically and always will be and while it is the duty of the Government to hold the scales evenly between capital and labour when the one endeavours to exploit the other, any support for the Federation is ammunition for those forces which are being used to destroy our party and our policy.'[75]

Publicly, Londonderry still maintained his call for 'mutual respect and understanding between employers and employed', as he informed an audience at Belfast on 15 October, and he insisted that he remained 'convinced that there was a prevailing desire on the part of parties to come together.'[76] But the partisanship evident in his letter to Baldwin also became more apparent in his public interventions. He published in the press on 26 October a recent letter to Sidney Webb

which claimed that a Dawdon miner had been denied financial assistance for his sick child out of a relief fund, 'on the grounds that the applicant and his wife had both voted for the Conservative candidate at the last General Election … I am bringing this case before you as a real example of the tyranny which the Labour Party practises throughout the country, a tyranny which is mainly responsible for the continuance of the strike, and by which, through this and other forms of intimidation, it is hoped to secure unwilling support at the next election.'[77] He spoke at the Cambridge Union on 23 November against the motion 'That only by the adoption of Socialist principles in her government can Britain ensure the happiness and prosperity of her people.'[78] Around the same time he wrote to Churchill, defending the owners in the same manner that he had to Baldwin, that they were 'fighting socialism ... one of the most powerful army corps in the field against us'.[79] Unlike the prime minister, Churchill took the trouble to respond, writing on 3 November that it 'is not the business of Coal Owners as Coal Owners to fight Socialism. If they declare it their duty, how can they blame the Miners' Federation for pursuing political ends? The business of the Coal Owners is to manage their industry successfully, to insist upon sound economic conditions as regards hours and wages, and to fight Socialism as citizens and not as owners of a particular class of property.'[80]

Speaking at Jarrow on 3 December, Londonderry initially appeared in his opening remarks to return to the more emollient language that he had employed earlier in the year, with the claim that he was 'a strong believer in trade unions and he saw a great future for them.' But his animus towards the MFGB quickly manifested itself, as it was accompanied by the barbed observation that the government and the churches had been 'used by Mr Cook for the purpose of prolonging the struggle'.[81] On 16 December, by which point most of the miners had returned to work, thoroughly beaten and considerably poorer, he informed the Seaham Harbour Constitutional Club 'that he claimed no victory at all. He had been a very heavy loser. The funds which he had hoped to utilize in extending enterprises at Seaham, and in schemes which would have benefited the district, had been dissipated in useless idleness instead of being used in profitable production.

Work on his new colliery had been delayed for seven months, and the employment which it would have found for thousands of workers had been proportionately delayed.' Only Cook, Londonderry averred, 'had gained a victory … The miners had been pawns in the game, and he had won nearly all his objectives. He had caused enormous loss to the mining industry and to the country.'[82] Two days later Londonderry delivered a similar message at a ceremony to open the new premises of the Royal Antediluvian Order of Buffaloes at Seaham Harbour, which was built on a site cleared of undesirable slum property. 'He had built more than 200 houses during the past two or three years', *The Times* reported him as saying, 'and, but for the effects of the coal stoppage on financial resources, he would have been continuing to build.'[83] On 8 January 1927 he devoted much of his address to the annual dinner of the Dawdon Colliery Officials' Association to attacking Cook, alluding to the general secretary's former membership of the Communist Party of Great Britain in the claim that he 'talked gaily to his Moscow friends about a revolution in this country'.[84] Three days later, when he addressed several thousand people gathered at Sunderland in support of the Industrial Peace Union, established by the veteran trade unionist, Havelock Wilson, and organised locally by Lord Castlereagh among others, Londonderry's speech in support of the organisation's purported aim was peppered with attacks on Cook and his 'wicked and insane ideals.'[85]

These two messages were coherent in so far as Londonderry regarded Cook, not the miners, as the root of the problem. He in effect turned the popular view of the owners on its head, presenting Cook as the real exploiter of the miners' predicament. Indeed, his attacks on Cook and the MFGB can be read as an example of a rhetorical strategy among Conservatives after 1918, which drew a distinction between ordinary working-class men and women and a sectional labour movement that challenged the moderation of the Conservatives.[86] It was given institutional expression in some parts of the country, including County Durham, through the National Conservative League, an ancillary working-class movement outside the formal party organisation.[87] Londonderry presided over his county's grand lodge on 11 April 1927, which met

to pass a resolution in support of the government's new trade union bill.[88] The legislation went some way to addressing calls on the right of the Conservative party for a punitive measure by prohibiting strikes that were interpreted as inflicting hardship on the community, by providing a wide definition of intimidation during strikes, and by making trade unionists contract in rather than contract out of the political levy paid to the Labour party.[89] Writing to *The Times* shortly after the grand lodge meeting, Londonderry claimed that the bill gave expression to 'certain principles with which every one is in agreement', and he rounded on 'the so-called moderate Labour leaders' for failing to support the measure.[90] On 30 April, he went further, describing the bill to Conservatives at Durham as the 'Charter of the Working Man' as 'it gave him liberty which he did not now possess.'[91] Londonderry spoke on three occasions during the bill's passage through the House of Lords, on 30 June, 12 July, and 13 July, revisiting the themes of his recent speeches and taking an active part in shaping the legislation.[92] In spite of the resulting Act and the other notable victories over the miners mentioned above, Londonderry was moved in August to contribute a letter to *The Times* criticising 'the miners' representatives' for thinking that the coal industry could resume the *status quo ante* because 'the coal export trade of this country has been destroyed as a result of a seven-months' strike which they themselves brought about.'[93]

The relative moderation displayed by Londonderry in the lead up to and during the general strike, which at the time encountered resistance from Baldwin, had given way in the months that followed to a protracted and persistent posture of hostility to Cook and his union, and in due course to a sharper critique of trade unionism and the Labour party. If Londonderry's direction of travel put him at odds with Baldwin and Churchill, he had not disavowed his earlier rhetoric on co-operation and mutual understanding, even if it appeared otherwise to those not paying close attention. This helps to explain the government's decision to appoint him the chairman of a royal commission in July 1927, which went on to examine the ownership and use of London squares.[94] And when the prime minister needed a peer to face down a revolt at his party's annual conference later in the year, he agreed to Harold Macmillan's suggestion of Londonderry.

Londonderry's task was to challenge the popular cry among ordinary party members for the House of Lords to have its powers restored, or at least strengthened, as a constitutional safeguard to a future Labour government.[95] As he gave his speech to the conference, Londonderry was met with protests of 'no, no' from the floor, and he failed to carry the day.[96] As the *Manchester Guardian* commented, it was 'too liberal a speech to find much acceptance here.'[97] But it still served him well, for the following June he was appointed Lord Lieutenant of County Durham, and months later he joined the cabinet as First Commissioner of Works.[98]

These developments would have been unlikely had Londonderry's anti-MFGB rhetoric been his only contribution to public debate on the future of the coal industry. Crucially, he had remained open to important elements of the Samuel commission's report, including the principle of amalgamations—when these advantaged owners, miners and consumers—and its proposal for an element of co-operation in the retailing of coal.[99] And locally, he continued to play the role of paternalist colliery owner. The annual meeting of the Durham County Aged Mineworkers' Association reported on 28 May 1927 that 'despite the [recent] strike, the contributions to the association from miners, owners, and private subscribers totalled £37,610', and it noted in particular Londonderry's earlier gift of the Castlereagh Aged Miners' Homes, at a cost of £6,000, his handing over £1,693 for maintenance, and his granting 'the inmates free coal for all time.'[100] On 3 March 1928 Londonderry presented prizes at the final of the Durham, Westmoreland and Cumberland Mines Inspection District Ambulance League, a competition made up of sixty teams of volunteers trained to rescue injured and trapped miners.[101] Several months later, on 18 June, he held a ceremony at his new colliery at Seaham Harbour to celebrate reaching the bottom of the Vane shaft, informing the gathered miners that 'he was told by numbers of people that he was engaged on what they almost called a foolish venture at the present time, but he was determined to take the risk, because he felt it his duty, if he had the opportunity, to develop industry ... not only for the benefit of himself and his family, but to increase the wealth and prosperity of the district and the country, which was of far greater importance.'[102] On 13

September, he reversed a decision to terminate the employment of 2,700 men and boys at his loss-making colliery at Seaham. The oldest pit operated by the Londonderry Collieries, it was inevitably more expensive to maintain than the newer pit at Seaham Harbour, and it had for some time only operated one or two days a week. Londonderry's original notice of termination came as a devastating blow to the seven thousand residents of New Seaham, which depended entirely on the colliery. It was after meeting with a deputation representing the miners on 11 September that Londonderry agreed to keep the pit open for a further period.[103]

That decision in the autumn of 1928, and the method of arriving at it, put into practice a recent initiative in industrial co-operation that came to be known as the Mond-Turner talks, named after the industrialist and colliery owner, Alfred Mond, and the TUC's chairman, Ben Turner. Mond chose thirty-nine leading industrialists to participate alongside him, selected not as representatives of their industries or employers' associations, but for their progressive outlook. As noted above, Mond had worked with Londonderry during the general strike and he now sought to do so again.[104] When news of the initiative emerged in December 1927, Londonderry informed Conservatives at Dawdon that 'He thought they owed Sir Alfred a deep debt of gratitude for rendering possible a meeting between employers and employed and tribute should be paid to the leaders of the Trades Union Congress for the manner in which they had accepted the invitation.'[105] He was subsequently selected as one of Mond's seven-man subcommittee charged with carrying on detailed talks with the TUC's subcommittee. Londonderry was now able to project the image of himself as an established and consistent advocate of industrial peace, an understandable if selective reading of his record in the period since 1926.[106] He was unwittingly assisted by Cook's persistent hostility to the talks which he derided as 'Mond moonshine.'[107]

The two subcommittees met throughout the spring and summer and agreed an interim report on 4 July 1928.[108] Londonderry's warmth towards the men sitting across the table was obvious from his public statements. 'It was comparatively easy for employers to consent to this

discussion', he informed the Industrial Co-partnership Association in March, 'but all would agree that the TUC had had a more difficult task. He was willing and anxious to pay a great tribute to the leaders of the TUC for having come so willingly and showing themselves anxious to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion with the employers.'[109] Addressing Conservatives at Durham on 13 May, he referred to his being 'engaged with conferences with leaders of the TUC and whenever those meetings came round he welcomed them more and more.' It was 'no use sweating workmen and calling upon them to work long hours for low wages', he informed the same meeting, 'for the simple reason that when the human element was destroyed discontent was created in industry.'[110] On 18 June, he assured a gathering of employees at his new colliery at Seaham Harbour 'that the employers were beginning to see that cooperation was the real factor which was desired.'[111] Addressing a garden fete at Bishop Auckland on 4 July, he looked forward to the publication of the interim report, which, he assured his audience, 'would do much to bring about a spirit of conciliation and cooperation' through the establishment of a National Industrial Council consisting of representatives of the TUC and the Federation of Employers.[112] The resulting report recommended recognition of the trade unions as the most effective and appropriate representatives of the workers, it called for the rationalization of industries, it opposed the 'victimisation' of trade unionists, and, as Londonderry highlighted before its publication, it devised permanent machinery for industrial co-operation.

V

The new mood created by the Mond-Turner talks was undermined by the hostile response of employers' organisations. Nevertheless, it had done much to boost Londonderry's reputation, and there was understandable speculation in the press that it contributed to Baldwin's decision to appoint him First Commissioner of Works.[113] His ministerial office obliged Londonderry to withdraw from the Mond-Turner process, which continued after the report's publication, but he continued to lend it his enthusiastic support.[114] Likewise, although the day to day running of the

Londonderry Collieries was left to others, he could not afford to ignore what went on at the company. His appointment to the cabinet, after all, had aroused some controversy on account of the Londonderrys' willingness to act as hosts for the Conservative party at their Park Lane property, Londonderry House; the first Earl of Birkenhead famously quipped at the time that Lord Londonderry had dined his way to the cabinet.[115]

On 26 November 1928 Londonderry presided over a public dinner to celebrate the centenary of the construction of Seaham Harbour's dock. It was held just two months after Londonderry had issued then reversed notices of termination at the oldest of his three pits, Seaham, so it is not surprising that he only referred to the new pit at Seaham Harbour when claiming that he was an 'incorrigible optimist' about the future.[116] In a follow up article on Seaham's history, published in *The Times*, he also gave a positive assessment of his colliery at Dawdon, which he claimed 'has been developed to a remarkable degree of perfection, and now gives employment to 3,700 men and boys' with an output of four thousand tons a day.[117] However, by March the following year, Dawdon was the scene of a major dispute between managers and miners following the decision of the former to reduce piece work rates. The resulting stand-off resulted in a lock out that lasted fifteen weeks. In contrast to his handling of Seaham the previous September, Londonderry declined to meet with a deputation of the miners at Dawdon. 'I am quite conversant with the terms offered to you', he informed them, 'which are fair and reasonable, and, as you must be aware, will merely bring the colliery more into line with the customs and conditions prevailing in other collieries in the county.'[118]

Londonderry had previously enjoyed relatively cordial relations with his employees at Dawdon, attending social functions at its working men's club on a number of occasions.[119] However, his attitude at this juncture was not as intransigent as it might at first appear. The Durham Miners' Association had also declined to support the Dawdon miners, which provided the opportunity for the Communist Party to take a greater role in the dispute.[120] On learning that the prime minister was to receive a deputation from the MFGB, the First Commissioner wrote

to him on 5 March to explain the situation at Dawdon, 'the best pit in the North of England.' '[B]ecause I have asked the miners to accept the rates of pay which are the custom throughout the whole country, the pit in consequence is idle. I should like to point out that the notices were given over a fortnight ago but the men have kept on postponing their meeting and now, when the notices have expired, I receive a letter saying that they want to have an interview with me.' But rather than blame the Communist Party, he attributed responsibility to the MFGB, 'the moment the Federation representatives come in, there is always trouble because it is the main policy of the Federation to misrepresent the Owners.'[121] Baldwin was not unfamiliar with his cabinet colleague's sensitivity about the reputation of his collieries. The publicity generated by the Prince of Wales's recent visit to pit villages in Northumberland and County Durham had provoked the First Commissioner to complain to the prime minister about the prince's reference to 'appalling conditions.'[122]

Apathy among Conservative supporters ahead of the general election, eventually called for 30 May 1929, along with Londonderry's dual role as government minister and colliery owner, meant that his public statements on the labour movement returned to the dualism—commending the TUC's moderation and attacking the Labour party and MFGB's extremism—that had characterised his interventions before joining the Mond-Turner talks. On hearing that the leaders of both the Labour party and the Communist Party, Ramsay MacDonald and Harry Pollitt respectively, intended to stand in the Seaham constituency, Londonderry quipped to a meeting of Seaham Conservatives that 'On a great many issues, I believe, they see eye to eye, but it is characteristic of our opponents that they are always quarrelling.'[123] There were further partisan speeches up to the date of the poll and after. In an address to Seaham Conservatives on 21 October, Londonderry complained that the MFGB's leaders were responsible for 'nine-tenths of the difficulties [that] the coal trade is labouring under at the present moment', and he attributed the recent problems at Dawdon to 'the example of Mr Cook …who spreads his revolution in our midst … And here we are, after this dispute, not one iota better.'[124]

Yet, in the same speech, Londonderry also endorsed efforts by MacDonald's second Labour government to facilitate negotiations between representatives of the coal owners and the miners, and he held out the hope that 'if we can work in a spirit of cooperation these difficulties which we have experienced recently will be a thing of the past never to return.'[125] Similarly, in an address the following month to Sunderland's Chamber of Commerce, he outlined 'three new elements which appeared to … hamper the development of prosperity in industry.' These were, predictably, the 'attitude of extremist Labour', government interference in trade, and 'excessive taxation', but he went on to remark that 'it was encouraging to see the support given to the movement for cooperation by the Trades Union Congress', and he looked forward to the outcome of negotiations carried on between the government, trade unions and coal owners. He now recognised more explicitly that Cook dissented from the course taken by the TUC, and although he continued to insist that the MFGB's general secretary 'was responsible for the present difficulties', he was just as clear about the other cause, the 'world-wide factors which it was their duty to meet as best they could.'[126]

The outcome of the government's negotiations with owners and miners was the Coal Mines bill that was introduced to parliament in 1929 and passed the following year. In many respects it was a bill that was in the spirit of Mond-Turner and broadly favourable to the owners; a reflection of the fact that even when Labour was in power, government influence on industrial relations remained relatively weak, with even the unions desiring the formal neutrality of the state.[127] The bill, as such, did not compel amalgamations but facilitated them, and mineral rights were left untouched. The working day would be reduced from eight hours but only by a mere thirty minutes. It also made provisions to set prices and production quotas for the home market. Having long deprecated government interference, the failure of price cuts to deal with declining consumption convinced the majority of owners to support these measures.[128] It is perhaps surprising then that Londonderry, contrary to what he had said at Sunderland, and in contrast to his earlier involvement in the Mond-Turner talks, was greatly troubled by the legislation. Political

opportunism cannot be discounted. The minority Labour government experienced considerable difficulty with the bill in the House of Commons, through its efforts to secure Liberal support, which made it easier to pick apart and question the coherence of the resulting legislation.[129] Early on, Londonderry signalled that 'he deprecated strongly any Government interference.'[130] Speaking at Seaham Harbour Conservative Club on 5 January 1930, he described the measure as 'a very bad Bill indeed'. Like other Conservative critics, he argued that it would increase the price of coal to the consumer. What was required was 'an abundance' of the 'cheapest possible fuel', though he acknowledged that industries which were 'sheltered' from foreign competition could pay more.[131] He again rounded on the bill when addressing a meeting of Conservatives at Penarth on 27 March. The reduction in the working day meant a reduction in wages, 'It was necessary that the industry should make both ends meet.' Amalgamations should not be compelled, he went on, and quotas 'implied a reduction of production, and that necessarily, in his judgement, meant an increase in the price of coal.'[132]

It might be assumed that Londonderry, like other coal exporters in County Durham, would object to the bill's provisions for marketing coal.[133] Yet, in contrast to his misgivings about most of the legislation's important provisions, he referred to its proposed selling schemes as the 'one bright spot in the Bill.'[134] He justified this with reference to the recent tendency of export districts to turn to the domestic market. This had resulted in increased competition and reduced prices for consumers, the latter giving rise to unwelcome consequences for both the owners' profits and miners' wages.[135] 'At the present stage of industry cutthroat competition among themselves was not calculated to operate in their interests or in the interest of the community, and he felt that a marketing association would give them an economic price for their coal.'[136] He still referred to the bill as 'a stepping-stone' towards nationalization, and he claimed that while he was not opposed to all the proposals in the legislation, he was opposed to their being enacted in statute. But as most senior Conservatives recognised, rejecting the bill, or passing an amendment that addressed one of its fundamental purposes, or passing a number of amendments that

amounted to a rejection, all risked a confrontation between the unelected peers and the House of Commons. It would, as Londonderry conceded, create 'chaos and confusion'.[137] In May and June, when the bill reached its committee stage in the House of Lords, Londonderry's contributions effectively deferred to his party leader in the chamber, the fourth Marquess of Salisbury, and also to Mond—now first Baron Melchett—who took the lead in advancing amendments that were broadly in keeping with the legislation, albeit with the purpose of limiting or eliminating any risk of compulsion on the owners.[138]

Whatever Londonderry's apparent misgivings with the Coal Mines Act 1930, he was remarkably self-assured several months later when he addressed a gathering of the Institute of Fuel on how he was 'an optimist', about his pride in the pit that he had sunk at Seaham Harbour—'it was going to be the greatest success in the world'—and in expressing his confidence that 'notwithstanding all the devices which individuals endeavoured to put into practice, they would always find that economic laws would come through in the end'.[139] Londonderry's confidence on that occasion might also have been bolstered by developments at Dawdon. The communists had since the previous year's lockout retained their significant influence in the local lodge of the Durham Miners' Association, but they had failed to achieve the local hegemony that the party had in some Welsh pit villages.[140] In February 1930 Londonderry publicised in the press what he described as the Dawdon lodge's 'victimisation' of a miner, William Wharton, who during the lockout had obtained work elsewhere and returned to Dawdon at its conclusion, by putting 'undesirable pressure' on him to vacate his house.[141] And five months later, it was reported that Londonderry had won an arbitration dispute arising from the lockout. Awarded £535 in back money, he agreed to accept £100 and donated it to the Dawdon Aged Miners' Homes.[142]

If these incidents suggest that he remained adversarial in his approach to the situation at Dawdon, his private appeal to the prime minister paints a more complex picture. In a letter that enclosed a copy of the *Lamp*, a newssheet published by the communists at Dawdon, he drew

MacDonald's attention to the fact that the publication attacked not only him but also local officials of the Durham Miners' Association, and that as a result, 'I do feel that in opposition to Communism and everything else that this newspaper stands for, the Dawdon Lodge, yourself and myself, must be at one.' He went on to inform the prime minister that he and Lord Castlereagh had recently met with the executive of the Dawdon lodge, at which they had 'a very interesting and amicable conversation … and whilst I was able to do something for them, I found myself compelled to refuse some of the requests which they made.' He then requested that the two men work together 'publicly as well as we seem to be able to work together privately, because I feel very strongly that as time goes on, if the management and the executive of the Lodge are continually at logger heads, that we shall entrench the Communists in a far stronger position than they are in at the present moment … I do not know if you are aware of it, but the Urban District Council is the Dawdon Lodge, and the Dawdon Lodge is the Urban District Council, and the result is that all sorts of jobs are being found for the friends of one or the other.'[143]

The two men's common disposition to oppose the local activities and influence of the Communist Party, along with the notoriously close friendship established between Lady Londonderry and MacDonald, meant that the expectation of co-operation was not without foundation. These important considerations aside, party politics could still divide Seaham's MP and the local colliery owner. On 3 January 1931 Londonderry delivered a highly partisan speech to the Seaham Harbour Conservative Association, in which he spoke at length on why Labour was 'unfit to govern'. Among his list of reasons, he revisited his earlier accusations by claiming that the party 'is dominated by militant political members of the trade unions.'[144] Days later, MacDonald also spoke at Seaham Harbour and referred pointedly to Londonderry's speech to question the fitness of colliery owners to run their industry. 'I am sorry', the prime minister was reported as saying, 'he is not disappointed with us as much as I am disappointed with him.'[145] If this was the knock about of party politics, then the run up to the general election held later in the

year, on 27 October, could not have been more different. Now fronting up both the National Labour party and a coalition government that included the National Liberals and Conservatives, MacDonald endured a torrid time campaigning in his Seaham constituency. The practical help that he now received from local Conservatives, including Londonderry, only inflamed the anger of Labour supporters.[146] Little wonder, then, that 'One of the questions most frequently asked Mr MacDonald at his meetings', *The Times* reported in reference to Londonderry's reappointment as First Commissioner of Works, 'is why a post in the [Emergency National] Government was given to Lord Londonderry who has mining interests in the constituency.[147] As if to reassure his constituents, MacDonald was reduced to making jokes that he would haul Londonderry 'over the coals'.[148]

VI

In contrast to earlier periods of economic instability, miner's wages in the early thirties were remarkably stable against the backdrop of the great depression.[149] And in the wake of the 1930 Act, the attitude of most coal owners underwent a discernible shift.[150] In particular, the reduction of the working day to 7½ hours disposed owners in the early thirties to lessen their attachment to district arrangements in favour of collective or national discussions about wages, in the spirit of what Londonderry had advocated in 1926. The changed mood was observable at Dawdon, where only a few years previously Londonderry had locked out his employees for fifteen weeks. At a ceremony held on 9 January 1932, Londonderry and his son, Castlereagh, formally opened new pit head baths at the colliery, designed to accommodate 2,500 men, at a cost of £32,000. 'Some of you—and I believe you do it more good-naturedly than otherwise—are inclined to express your criticism not only of me but of my forebears in very forcible language (Laughter)', he was reported as saying to the gathered miners. 'Whatever condemnation you pass on my forebears it is not correct. They have always tried to inculcate in those of us who came after them a sense of our responsibilities, and I sincerely hope that I have been able to carry out with

some success those duties … My sympathies and my hopes are with the people in this neighbourhood to which I am proud to belong.' In his vote of thanks, James Gilliland, a senior official in the Durham Miners' Association, made the remarkable declaration that 'if the question of the ownership of Dawdon Colliery was put to the vote of the workers, 90 per cent would vote in favour of the continued ownership of Lord Londonderry (Cheers). He knew of some collieries that had passed out of the hands of Lord Londonderry, and, if the workmen were given an opportunity to ballot, they would come back again.'[151]

Given the praise from this quarter, it is little wonder that colliery owners in the area declined to support the Non-Political Union. Londonderry responded to Havelock Wilson's request to owners for £30,000, to establish the organisation as district mining unions, by giving only £50 and asking that his subscription should not be publicised as it would antagonise the Durham Miners' Association. Such parsimony and concealment inevitably frustrated local Conservatives.[152] Further public gestures followed. In response to a request from Seaham Urban District Council for the sale or lease of his land at Dawdon Dene, for the purpose of creating a public park, Londonderry announced in July 1933 that he would transfer 21 acres as a free gift.[153] In December that year, against the backdrop of rising unemployment on the Durham coalfield, it was announced that Londonderry would make a gift of half a ton of coal to each unemployed workman of the Londonderry Collieries in the Seaham district, who had been in receipt of a coal allowance when working.[154] These actions were broadly in line with several of the recommendations of the Samuel commission, as well as being in keeping with the paternalism that Londonderry still practised at his collieries. They had the additional utility, he might have considered, of potentially helping his reputation as an owner and lessening the controversy surrounding his re-appointment to the cabinet in November 1931, as Secretary of State for Air. But criticism never abated, and it could come from unfamiliar quarters. The passages on industrial distress in east Durham in J.B. Priestley's *English Journey* particularly displeased Londonderry.[155] Given that his family had created and built-up Seaham Harbour over the

preceding one hundred years, it is hardly surprising that he would be offended by descriptions of it as a place that looks 'as weird as a cart-horse with scales and fins', that 'it seemed drearier than the ordinary inland mining towns, perhaps because the coast itself there has a dirty and depressing look.' More particularly, he would have bristled at Priestley's observation that 'its citizens are all being shockingly underpaid', but that 'the ground landlords and royalty owners had not done badly out of it.'[156]

The coal trade's revival in the mid-1930s did not at first lead to any significant increase in miners' wages.[157] As a result, it appeared that a national strike was on the cards in the autumn of 1935, coinciding with Londonderry's departure from the National Government. In a marked departure from previous practice, however, the MAGB responded by approaching the industry's largest customers to secure an increase in what they paid for their coal, so that this could be passed on to the miners. It represented what Supple describes as a new interpretation of self-interest, a sense that the owners' had little or no public support for their traditional posture, and a realisation that the miners were not extremists and that they could be 'weaned away from their more radical representatives'.[158] Londonderry had alluded to such a possibility in 1930, and he welcomed the owners' belated interpretation of self-interest in an address to the House of Lords on 11 December 1935. The rationale, as he acknowledged four years previously, was the result of what he back then described as 'cutthroat competition'. He nevertheless cautioned that it would 'create tremendous changes throughout the industry and throughout the country', as the principle of correlating supplies with demand, alongside the established movement for amalgamations, would inevitably lead to pit closures, derelict districts, and unemployment. '[B]ut I venture to put forward my humble opinion, for what it may be worth, that in this age of organisation we cannot afford to follow any haphazard line of policy, or we shall fail in the mission which Great Britain has to fulfil as the leader in the world of progressive development.'[159]

Shortly afterwards, Londonderry approached Lord Beaverbrook about the possibility of the two men working together to promote a scheme along the lines that he had pressed for in parliament. 'The Coal business is not a possibility for me' the press baron wrote in reply, 'My newspaper business has grown to be very big. And my ambitions have grown to be very small.'[160] As a result, the more progressive attitude of the coal owners that emerged in this period did so without Londonderry assuming a high profile in the endeavour. Indeed, aside from addressing the House of Lords on the National Government's Coal bill in 1938, see below, his public interventions on the industry decreased markedly in the late thirties as his attention was given over almost entirely to the promotion of Anglo-German understanding.[161] Not that he altogether ignored the trade that had provided his family with enormous wealth.

Locally, Londonderry's relationship with his employees continued to benefit from the relatively benign economic conditions of the late 1930s. On 27 May 1936, he and Lady Londonderry, accompanied by his son and two of his daughters, Lady Maureen and Lady Mairi, were entertained 'by the townspeople of Seaham Harbour'. The rector of the local Catholic church, Father Heggarty, was effusive in his tribute to Lord Londonderry's 'work in Parliament and as soldier, Cabinet Minister, coalowner, and employer.' His generosity 'had been lavish to all sections. No peer or commoner in the land had done more for his people.'[162] Heggarty's praise probably owed something to the generous terms that Londonderry rented land to the Catholic parish church, in the face of deeply rooted opposition from Anglicans and Non-conformists.[163] Still, on 11 December, Londonderry gave some satisfaction to the hyperbole by opening new pit head baths at Seaham Harbour, to accommodate 1,600 miners. The £16,000 required to build the baths was raised by the Miners' Welfare Fund, but Londonderry committed to give fifty per cent of the annual maintenance charges.[164] Further local recognition came in October 1938 when he was given the freedom of Durham.[165]

The relatively improved industrial relations of the mid- to-late thirties had an impact on Londonderry's outlook generally. Responding in May 1937 to news of the London Omnibus Strike, he informed a gathering of the Society of British Gas Industries, of which he was president, that he did not 'feel panicky nor did he believe what he had been told that all sorts of insidious forces were at work.'[166] And in contrast to his vocal hostility to the Labour government's 1929–30 Coal Mines bill, he largely confined his discomfort about the 1938 Coal bill to questioning the need for the National Government to introduce its own legislative reform to the industry. The legislation addressed what even the MAGB now held to be the main reason that prevented more amalgamations and general structural change, the fragmented system of royalty payments, by nationalizing royalties and increasing the role of the state in the industry through the Coal Commission.[167] In his contributions to the House of Lords, Londonderry suggested that the bill was the result of the MFGB's propaganda, he questioned how the government intended to calculate the value of royalties for the purpose of compensating the owners, he defended the record of the owners' capacity to organize their industry, and he argued for amalgamation through evolution not compulsion. But aside from a minor amendment to the wording of one section, he offered no real challenge to the bill, alluding to the growing international crisis over how to respond to Nazi Germany to justify his position.[168] The various inconsistencies that arose from the Coal Act 1938 gave its critics plenty to attack in the years that followed. Londonderry largely confined his public criticisms to questioning the prevailing wisdom, enshrined in the 1930 and 1938 Acts, which held that amalgamations would make the industry more efficient. The 'more closely' the question is examined, he wrote to *The Times* on 16 June 1939, 'the more apparent does it become that the [Coal] Commission itself is growing increasingly aware of the difficulties involved … difficulties inherent in the nature of the industry and not arising from an obstructive habit of mind on the part of the colliery owners.'[169] Supple, it should be noted, also calls into

question the simplistic assumption that amalgamations would have made the industry more efficient.[170]

Londonderry rarely made public interventions about the coal industry during the Second World War. A notable exception was a letter to *The Times* published in August 1941 which warned of looming coal shortages. He called for miners in the army to be 'more usefully employed in doing the work for which they have been specially trained', given that 'the number required for the pits is comparatively a small one in proportion to the Army as a whole', and for the miners' rations to maintain or increase their capacity for 'physical exertion.' He also defended the miners against 'unjust' criticisms of absenteeism. 'There is no body of men more determined to do their utmost to win the war than the miners.' He blamed instead 'the shortage of rations … by reason of the fact that it is impossible for the hewer to give of his best in sustained effort when he is not receiving the nourishment to which he has been accustomed.'[171] The problem was of course more complex than the individual physical capacity of the miners. The prevalence of older pits and the failure to fully mechanize the coal industry in the 1930s were also significant factors in explaining declining output, along with the reduction in the workforce during the same period.[172] Output remained a significant problem in wartime, and so another investigation of the industry's problems was established in 1944, under the chairmanship of Sir Charles Reid. The Reid commission's report damned the status quo and called for parliament to establish an authority to take control of and refinance the industry. With even many Conservatives coming round to the view that the coal trade required a significant overhaul, the owners still failed to use this last opportunity to fend off nationalization by establishing a voluntary trust to seek government finance.[173]

The Labour party's famous victory at the 1945 general election was followed months later by the publication of a bill to nationalize the coal industry. On 26 January 1946, Londonderry sent a message to the annual dinner of his colliery officials in which he

defended free enterprise as the best means of managing the pits. He nevertheless acknowledged that the owners might have handled things better in the past with reference to his own efforts. 'I wish I had been forceful enough to get my plan across', he said in reference to his intervention in 1926. 'Instead of that the colliery owners as a whole have taken for granted that the coal industry will be nationalised and have taken steps accordingly. The Mining Association have spoken for the coal trade, but I have not found myself in agreement with the attitude they took up, beyond full agreement with the undertaking to do everything in their power to increase production.'[174] Nationalization was of course a defeat, but the owners, including Londonderry, were compensated for the transfer of their collieries to the newly established National Coal Board.

VII

Londonderry inherited his collieries during the coal industry's long period of economic decline. This coincided with and contributed to heightening industrial tension locally and nationally, which in turn invited greater attention and scrutiny about how the industry was organized and managed. Hesitantly at first, Londonderry emerged from the ranks of the owners to recognise publicly the need for the industry to better organise itself. He became identified with a small number of moderate owners who articulated ideas that took others around five years to accept. It won him favourable recognition from senior Conservatives, and it helped to facilitate his appointments to the cabinet in 1928 and 1931. Being a moderate among owners did not stem his profound dislike of Arthur Cook, the MFGB's general secretary, and the type of trade unionism that he represented. In time, however, Londonderry came to appreciate and celebrate the contrasting approach of the TUC's general council, and he was able to establish reasonably good relations with the Durham Miners' Association. Throughout, Londonderry took steps to maintain the bonds of

paternalism in pit village life, and although he disinvested in some areas of his company's operations he invested in others.

Selective and partial readings of Londonderry's record as a colliery owner can easily depict him as hostile to the miners, or, conversely, as a far-sighted visionary among owners. In truth, his record is more complex than such simplistic readings allow. Ultimately, Londonderry was a leading figure in an industry that was in long term decline. The situation inflamed his dislike of the MFGB, but it also increased his frustration with the intransigence of other owners. He genuinely believed, perhaps naively, that if the miners and owners behaved responsibly, and agreed to a measure of reorganization, the industry might yet survive and regain its competitiveness. By the time that other owners moved in his direction, the situation had become almost irretrievable. Having failed to recruit Beaverbrook, it was not in Londonderry to take a lead in the late 1930s by steering the MAGB towards what needed to be done, that is, to seek government finance through endogenous reorganisation. Not only was he distracted by the need to vindicate his record as Air Minister and his controversial promotion of Anglo-German understanding, but he remained wedded to the principle of free enterprise. Had he kept his attention fixed on the industry that had made generations of his family immensely wealthy, the post-war Labour government might have been faced with an even greater challenge in its bid to nationalize the coal trade.

The author would like to acknowledge the helpful advice of Dr Alan Heesom and Dr Lewis Mates.

[1] For contrasting scholarly analysis, see A.J. Heesom, 'Entrepreneurial paternalism: the third Lord Londonderry (1778–1854) and the coal trade', *Durham University Journal*, 66 (1973–1974), pp. 238–256; A.J. Heesom, 'The northern coal miners and the opposition to the Coal Mines Act of 1842', *International Review of Social History*, 25, 2 (1980), pp. 236–271; A.J. Heesom, 'Coal, class and education in the north-east', *Past and Present*, 90 (1981), pp. 136–142.

[2] H. Montgomery Hyde, *The Londonderrys: A Family Portrait* (London, 1979); Anne de Courcy, *Circe: The Life of Edith, Marchioness of Londonderry* (London, 1993); J.A. Pauley, 'The Social and Political Roles of Edith, Marchioness of Londonderry, 1878–1959', Ph.D. thesis, University of Ulster (1994); A. Susan Williams, *Ladies of Influence: Women of the Elite in Interwar Britain* (London, 2000), pp. 13–38; N.C. Fleming, 'Lord Londonderry and Ulster Politics, 1921–6', in Joost Augusteijn, Mary Ann Lyons and Dierdre McMahon (eds), *Irish History: A Research Yearbook, 2* (Dublin, 2003), pp. 72–80; N.C. Fleming, 'Old and New Unionism: The Seventh Marquess of Londonderry, 1905–1921', in D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day (eds), *Ireland in Transition, 1867–1921* (London, 2004), pp. 223–240; Ian Kershaw, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry and Britain's Road to War* (London, 2004); Alvin Jackson, 'Stewart, Charles Stewart Henry Vane-Tempest-, seventh Marquess of Londonderry (1878–1949)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004); Diane Urquhart, 'Peeresses, Patronage and Power: The Politics of Ladies Frances Anne,

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[3] A. Susan Williams, *Ladies of Influence: Women of the Elite in Interwar Britain* (London, 2000), p. 21.

[4] Annabel Goldsmith, *Annabel: An Unconventional Life* (London, 2004), p. 53).

[5] Julian Symons, *The General Strike: A Historical Portrait* (London, 1957), pp. 183 ,189; Margaret Morris, *The General Strike* (Harmondsworth, 1976), p. 224, 259–260, 314, 325–326; Keith Middlemas (ed.), *Thomas Jones Whitehall Diary, vol. 2: 1926–1930* (London, 1969), pp. 76–77.

[6] Pauline Lynn, 'The impact of women. The shaping of political allegiance in county Durham, 1918–1945', *Local Historian*, 28, 3 (1998), pp. 159–175; Huw Beynon and Terry Austrin, *Masters and Servants: Class Patronage in the Making of a Labour Organisation: The Durham Miners and the English Political Tradition* (London, 1994); Pauline Lynn, 'Seaham revisited: The fruits of the electoral franchise?', *North East History*, 33 (2000), pp. 1–34; Hester Barron, *The 1926 Miners' Lockout: Meanings of Community in the Durham Coalfield* (Oxford, 2010).

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[8] See, for example, *House of Commons Debates*, 12 April 1907, vol. 172, cols 528–531; *House of Commons Debates*, 9 December 1908, vol. 198, col. 520.

[9] See, for example, *House of Commons Debates*, 26 March 1909, vol. 2, col. 2075.

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[11] Barry Supple, *The History of the British Coal Industry: vol. 4: 1913–1946: The Political Economy of Decline* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 20, 25.

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[13] *Coal Industry Commission: Report and Minutes of Evidence*, vol. 2 (Cmd. 360), Parliamentary Papers (1919), XII, pp. 631–633; *Aberdeen Journal*, 9 May 1919.

[14] Richard B. Simons, 'The British coal industry-a failure of private enterprise', *The Historian*, 16, 1 (1953), pp. 5–7.

[15] *The Times*, 18 August 1919.

[16] *The Times*, 22 December 1919.

[17] *The Times*, 2 September 1920; *The Times*, 20 September 1920.

[18] *The Times*, 23 April 1921.

[19] *Aberdeen Journal*, 19 May 1921.

[20] Robert Pearce, *Britain: Industrial Relations and the Economy 1900–39* (London, 1993), pp. 74–75.

[21] Henry Pelling, *A History of British Trade Unionism* (London, 1967), pp. 44–45; Roy Gregory, *The Miners and British Politics 1906–1914* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 68–81.

[22] Lewis Mates, *The Great Labour Unrest: Rank-and-File Movements and Political Change in the Durham Coalfield* (Manchester, 2016).

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[24] Londonderry afterwards offered it to Durham County for 'hospital purposes' and in 1928 it was opened as a sanatorium for tuberculosis sufferers, see *The Times*, 24 April 1923; *The Times*, 27 February 1928.

[25] *The Times*, 13 May 1922; *The Times*, 4 January 1923.

[26] Benyon and Austrin, *Masters and Servants*, pp. 203–205. On implications of this activity for working-class consciousness, see John Benson, *The Working Class in Britain 1850-1939* (London, 2003), p. 151.

[27] *The Times*, 25 August 1919.

[28] *The Times*, 21 August 1922; *The Times*, 28 August 1922. He later unveiled a memorial tablet to his chief mining agent, Mr V.W. Corbett, in Seaham Church, see *The Times*, 29 December 1929.

[29] *The Times*, 27 December 1922.

[30] *The Times*, 2 July 1923; Beynon and Austrin, *Masters and Servants*, pp. 296–298.

[31] *The Times*, 27 August 1923.

[32] Beynon and Austrin, *Masters and Servants*, p. 298.

[33] *The Times*, 15 January 1923.

[34] *The Times*, 30 August 1923.

[35] *The Times*, 8 September 1923.

[36] *The Times*, 26 May 1924.

[37] *The Times*, 19 November 1924. The number is reported in *The Times*, 30 May 1927.

[38] *The Times*, 2 December 1924.

[39] *The Times*, 30 March 1925.

[40] M.W. Kirby, *The British Coalmining Industry, 1870–1946* (London, 1977), pp. 66–91; Pearce, *Industrial Relations*, p. 76.

[41] *The Times*, 14 August 1925.

[42] *The Times*, 17 August 1925.

[43] *The Times*, 24 August 1925.

[44] Simons, 'British coal industry', p. 9.
[45] Londonderry to Baldwin, 18 December 1925, Cambridge University Library (CUL): Baldwin Papers 13, ff. 105–107.
[46] *The Times*, 9 January 1926.
[47] *The Times*, 11 January 1926.
[48] *The Times*, 12 January 1926.
[49] *The Times*, 23 January 1926; Marquess of Londonderry, *Wings of Destiny* (London, 1943), p. 34.
[50] Beaverbrook to Londonderry, 23 January 1926, Parliamentary Archives: Beaverbrook Papers, BBK/C/224.
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[52] *The Times*, 28 January 1926.
[53] Castlereagh to Adrian Holman, 1926 (Hyde, *Londonderrys*, p. 169); *Sunderland Echo*, 23 January 1926.
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[55] Londonderry to Baldwin, 13 April 1926, Middlemas, *Jones Whitehall Diary*, vol. 2, p. 10.
[56] Thomas to Londonderry, 14 April 1926, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI): Londonderry Papers, D3099/2/4/36.
[57] Morris, *General Strike*, p. 224.
[58] Cited in Stewart Mews, 'The Churches', in Morris, *General Strike*, p. 326.
[59] Symons, *General Strike*, pp. 182–6.
[60] Joyce Howson, 'The general strike: a bluff which was called?', *Modern History Review*, 8, 1 (1996), p. 21.
[61] Londonderry to Baldwin, 15 May 1926, CUL: Baldwin Papers 137, f. 87.
[62] Londonderry to Jones, n.d. [June 1926], CUL: Baldwin Papers 20, f. 235.
[63] *The Times* cites the *Colliery Guardian*, see *The Times*, 18 June 1926.
[64] Herbert Henson to Londonderry, 23 June 1926, PRONI D3099/2/4/39.
[65] *The Times*, 30 June 1926.
[66] Hester Barron, *The 1926 Miners' Lockout: Meanings of Community in the Durham Coalfield* (Oxford, 2010), p. 54, 117.
[67] *The Times*, 25 June 1926.
[68] *The Times*, 18 August 1926.
[69] *The Times*, 20 August 1926.
[70] Barron, *Miners' Lockout*, pp. 118–119; *Durham County Advertiser*, 18 June 1926.
[71] *House of Lords Debates*, 6 July 1926, vol. 64, cols 827–833.
[72] Jones, 26 August 1926, Middlemas, *Thomas Jones Diary*, vol. 2, p. 68; Jones, 5 September 1926, Middlemas, *Thomas Jones Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 76–77.
[73] Henry Pelling, 'Churchill and the labour movement', in Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), *Churchill* (Oxford, 1996), p. 121.
[74] Londonderry to Churchill, 6 September 1926, PRONI: Montgomery Hyde Papers, D3084/C/C/3/8. See also Londonderry and D.R. Llewellyn to Baldwin, 6 September 1926, CUL: Baldwin Papers 18, f. 64.
[75] Londonderry to Baldwin, 12 September 1926, CUL: Baldwin Papers 18, ff. 149–154.
[76] *The Times*, 16 October 1926.
[77] *The Times*, 26 October 1926. See also *The Times*, 2 November 1926.
[78] *The Times*, 24 November 1926.
[79] Londonderry to Churchill, 1926, cited in Hyde, *Londonderrys*, p. 172.
[80] Churchill to Londonderry, 3 November 1926, PRONI: Londonderry Papers, D3099/2/5.
[81] *The Times*, 4 December 1926.
[82] *The Times*, 17 December 1926.
[83] Londonderry also took the opportunity to deny that he owned 'all the old property at the centre of Seaham Harbour … he did not own a single house in that area … and he would never allow his rights as a ground landlord to stand in the way of the removal of unsatisfactory dwellings', *The Times*, 20 December 1926.
[84] *The Times*, 10 January 1927.
[85] *The Times*, 14 January 1926; W.R. Garside, *The Durham Miners, 1919–1960* (London, 1971), p. 234.
[86] Ross McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880–1950* (reprinted edition., Oxford, 1991), pp. 289–290.
[87] Stuart Ball, *Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918–1945* (Oxford, 2013), p. 159.
[88] *The Times*, 12 April 1927.
[89] N.C. Fleming, *Britannia's Zealots, vol. 1: Tradition, Empire and the Forging of the Conservative Right* (London, 2019), p. 147.
[90] *The Times*, 13 April 1927.
[91] *The Times*, 2 May 1927.
[92] *House of Lords Debates*, 30 June 1927, vol. 68, cols 28–29; *House of Lords Debates*, 12 July 1927, vol. 68, cols 339, 375–378; *House of Lords Debates*, 13 July 1927, vol. 68, cols 503–504, 513.
[93] *The Times*, 15 August 1927.
[94] *The Times*, 29 July 1927.

[95] Macmillan to Londonderry, 9 October 1927, PRONI: Londonderry Papers, D3099/2/13/A/4B.
[96] *Aberdeen Journal*, 7 October 1927.
[97] *Manchester Guardian*, 7 October 1927.
[98] *The Times*, 20 June 1928.
[99] *The Times*, 15 August 1927.
[100] *The Times*, 30 May 1927.
[101] *The Times*, 5 March 1928.
[102] *The Times*, 19 June 1928.
[103] *The Times*, 14 September 1928; *The Times*, 15 September 1928.
[104] G.W. McDonald and Howard F. Gospel, 'The Mond-Turner talks 1927–1933: A study in industrial co-operation', *Historical Journal*, 16, 4 (1973), pp. 818–819.
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[106] *The Times*, 30 December 1927.
[107] McDonald and Gospel, 'Mond-Turner talks', p. 821; Allen Hutt, *The Post-War History of the British Working Class* (London, 1937), pp. 177–181.
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[113] *Aberdeen Journal*, 20 October 1928.
[114] *The Times*, 26 October 1928.
[115] John Campbell, *F.E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead* (London, 1983), p. 805.
[116] *The Times*, 27 November 1928.
[117] *The Times*, 28 November 1928.
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[120] Lewis Mates, "We want real live wires, not gas pipes': Communism in the inter-war Durham coalfield', *Twentieth Century Communism*, 23, 23 (2022), p. 77.
[121] Londonderry to Baldwin, 5 March 1929, CUL: Baldwin Papers 85, ff. 144–146.
[122] Londonderry to Baldwin, 1 February 1929, cited in H. Montgomery Hyde, *Baldwin: The Unexpected Prime Minister* (London, 1973), p. 297. Londonderry accused the vicar of Dawdon of having socialist sympathies, see Rev. Duncan to Londonderry, 29 May 1929, PRONI: Londonderry Papers, D3099/2/4/75)). See Barron, *Miners' Lockout*, p. 170.
[123] *The Times*, 3 January 1929.
[124] *The Times*, 22 October 1929.
[125] *The Times*, 22 October 1929.
[126] *The Times*, 5 November 1929. See also *The Times*, 11 December 1929.
[127] Rodney Lowe, 'The government and industrial relations, 1919–39', in Chris Wrigley (ed.), *A History of British Industrial Relations, vol. 2: 1914–1939* (Brighton, 1987), pp. 185–210.
[128] Simons, 'British coal industry', p. 12.
[129] David Marquand, *Ramsay MacDonald* (London, 1977), pp. 525–531.
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[131] *The Times*, 6 January 1930.
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[133] Supple, *British Coal Industry*, p. 417.
[134] *The Times*, 28 March 1930.
[135] Simons, 'British coal industry', p. 11.
[136] *The Times*, 28 March 1930.
[137] *House of Lords Debates*, 29 April 1930, vol. 77, cols 180–192. See *The Times*, 28 April 1930.
[138] *House of Lords Debates*, 13 May 1930, vol. 77, cols 487–588; *House of Lords Debates*, 14 May 1930, vol. 77, cols 593–662; *House of Lords Debates*, 24 June 1930, vol. 78, cols 93–112.
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[145] *The Times*, 8 January 1931.
[146] Lynn, 'Seaham revisited', p. 20.

[147] *The Times*, 20 October 1931.
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[152] Beynon and Austrin, *Masters and Servants*, p. 336; Headlam, 27 September 1933, Ball, *Headlam Diaries*, pp. 279–280.
[153] *The Times*, 27 July 1933.
[154] *The Times*, 18 December 1933.
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[157] Simons, 'British coal industry', p. 13.
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[164] *The Times*, 13 December 1937.
[165] *The Times*, 7 October 1938.
[166] *The Times*, 6 May 1937.
[167] Supple, *British Coal Industry*, p. 406.
[168] *House of Lords Debates*, 5 May 1938, vol. 108, cols 912–920; *House of Lords Debates*, 26 May 1938, vol. 109, cols 628, 632–633, 674.
[169] *The Times*, 19 June 1939.
[170] Supple, *British Coal Industry*, pp. 400–401.
[171] *The Times*, 20 August 1941.
[172] Simons, 'British coal industry', pp. 12–13.
[173] Simons, 'British coal industry', p. 16.
[174] *The Times*, 28 January 1946.