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Land and Settlement: Temne Responses to British Abolitionist Intervention in Sierra Leone,
c. 1787-1815

Suzanne Schwarz¹

ABSTRACT: This article analyses how the Koya Temne on the Sierra Leone peninsula resisted attempts by British abolitionists to assume control over their land in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Following attacks on Freetown by neighboring leaders in 1801 and 1802, officials of the Sierra Leone Company (a chartered trading company formed in 1791) claimed that the Temne recourse to war was totally unjustified, as well as unexpected. This assessment was disingenuous, as Temne leaders had clearly asserted their rights to land around Freetown in a series of palavers held over the course of more than a decade. During these negotiations with British officials, the Temne attempted to protect areas of land they regarded as sacred by requesting modifications to boundary lines. Such requests were dismissed. Evidence drawn from reports of successive palavers indicates that the behavior of Company officials towards their Temne hosts created the conditions for conflict. As a result of the ongoing disagreements over land rights, the Temne were displaced from large areas of territory on the peninsula by the first decade of the nineteenth century.

I

Land in West Africa was central to plans devised by British abolitionists to attack the slave trade on its supply side in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The directors of the Sierra Leone Company, a chartered trading company formed in 1791, considered that new forms of land use by Africans, as well as by immigrants of African descent, would free the continent from the evils of the transatlantic slave trade.² They assumed that tutelage by Europeans would enable Africans to grow valuable crops on land they perceived to be hitherto unused or underutilised,³ and that this would have the effect of shifting the basis of

exchange from a slave trading economy to one based on the supply of agricultural commodities.⁴ In their first report to shareholders in 1791, the directors explained how they intended to commence experimentation on a large area of Temne land, which they maintained had been sold “for ever,” and vested in the British Crown, under the terms of treaties in 1787 and 1788.⁵

These ideas for reform were encapsulated in a bronze token struck at the Soho Mint in Birmingham in 1814, six years after the private colony in the control of the Sierra Leone Company had been transferred to British Crown control. The obverse depicted an imaginary rural idyll showing Africans tending the soil, and presumably producing the type of crops that would form the basis of a new “legitimate” commerce to replace the trade in human cargo.⁶ The token anticipated a future in which the combined influence of the passage of the Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807 and the deployment of Royal Navy patrols to intercept illicit slave ships would create the conditions in which free African laborers would be available to cultivate the land.⁷ The tokens had a hidden symbolism, as it was reported that they had been “made from the coppers of vessels condemned for Slave trading transmitted to this country by Governor Maxwell....”⁸

The imagery also looked back to experimentation by the Sierra Leone Company, and encapsulated its vision of an African continent reformed through policies of “Commerce, Civilization and Christianity.”⁹ The depiction of a European shaking hands with an African in the foreground was intended to convey the idea that friendship and collaboration would bring about mutually beneficial forms of change in Africa. By portraying the European with his left hand placed on his breast, the token declared that white men were pledging themselves to the needs of Africa with sincerity. This propaganda mirrored ideas for the use of land and labor that the Company had promoted on the upper Guinea coast over a period of seventeen years. However, this image totally concealed the hostile relationship which had developed between

Company officials and neighboring Temne over land ownership and land usage. This fractured relationship led to the expulsion of the Temne from large areas of their territory on the peninsula by 1802.¹⁰ When the Temne launched an attack on Freetown in November 1801, Company officials described it as “sudden” and “unprovoked.” This was disingenuous, and completely obscured the way in which Temne leaders had repeatedly made Company officials aware of their concerns about territorial rights, sovereignty and land usage over the course of more than a decade.¹¹

Temne land has featured extensively, albeit obliquely, in historiographical debate on Sierra Leone. When the black Loyalist settlers from Nova Scotia protested against the failure of Sierra Leone Company officials to allocate their promised plots, the land they were attempting to secure for their own private use was Temne land.¹² This article shifts the focus of debate by tracing how neighboring Temne reacted to the Company’s attempts to appropriate and make use of land on the Sierra Leone peninsula as a means of implementing their agenda for reform. Opposition was not the only way the Temne responded to the Company’s presence on the coast. However, it is clear that from an early stage they expressed their resistance to European attempts to assume control over their land through a variety of peaceful forms of protest, threats of violence and, as a last resort, attacks on the colony.¹³ The Temne were not the first Africans to resist European attempts to claim legal ownership of land.¹⁴ In the seventeenth century, Fante authorities on the Gold Coast rejected Dutch and English claims that the land on which their forts were built had been ceded to them.¹⁵ As Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell have demonstrated, the Khoikhoi and San resisted Dutch encroachment on their land in south-western Africa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁶

The exceptionally rich body of documentation surviving for Freetown makes it possible to reconstruct local responses in considerable detail. Temne voices, although

sometimes drowned out by the dominant sound of Company officials, can still be heard clearly in accounts of “palavers” (or conferences) contained in the journals of Lieutenant John Clarkson, Zachary Macaulay, and the Minutes of Governor and Council in Freetown.¹⁷ Between 1788 and 1801, neighboring Temne leaders used palavers in their attempts to resolve a series of recurring issues on customary payments for land, territorial boundaries, land usage and the duties that they maintained the inhabitants of Freetown and Granville Town owed them.¹⁸ Issues of land ownership and land use in West Africa clearly intersect with many aspects of Lovejoy’s influential scholarship.¹⁹ As far as this article is concerned, however, his leadership in preserving hundreds of rare and endangered manuscripts in the Sierra Leone Public Archives has been of particular significance. The interpretation presented in this article is informed by reference to a range of sources held at Fourah Bay College, including eighteenth- and nineteenth-century treaties, orders issued to officials of the Sierra Leone Company, maps and plans, and a long series of Registers of Liberated Africans, among other archival sources.²⁰

II

The hostile depiction of the Temne, which dominated Company accounts from at least 1802, does not provide an accurate reflection of their reactions to the settlement fifteen years earlier. Temne leaders on the Sierra Leone peninsula initially welcomed approximately four hundred settlers into their territory in May 1787, even though they were given no prior warning of their arrival, nor of their intention to establish a settlement. Negotiations that followed between May and June 1787, and again in August 1788, resulted in Temne leaders granting permission to the immigrants to establish a settlement on the northern tip of the Sierra Leone peninsula.²¹

Two weeks after mooring in the Sierra Leone River on Thursday 10 May 1787, Captain Thomas Boulden Thompson reported to the Admiralty that, “I have every Prospect of establishing the Black Poor at this Place in a pleasant Spot, and that I have hitherto met with little Difficulty from the Natives.”²² On 11 May, Thompson went ashore to meet King Tom, the local ruler, at his town at Ro Fransa, located about a mile to the west of the site selected for Granville Town. No detailed record is available for the negotiations that resulted in King Tom, Queen Yammacouba and Pa Bongee making their marks on a treaty accepting rum, tobacco, iron, muskets, hats and various manufactured goods in return for a large swathe of Temne territory.²³ Two weeks later on 25 May, “King Naynbanna” (also “Annamboyna” in another version of the ship’s log and later spelled Naimbanna or Naimbana in other sources) came on board to “settle the purchase of the land.”²⁴ This was a misunderstanding on the part of the ship’s officers, as Naimbana would not have seen the arrangement as a sale but as authorization for a temporary settlement.²⁵ Naimbana, King Tom’s overlord, disembarked the next day, apparently without reaching agreement. It was King Tom, his subordinate, who was saluted with eleven guns at 2 p.m. on 12 June 1787 on the “ratification of the purchase of the land for the free community.”²⁶ Thompson was under the impression that he had made a one-off payment to King Tom in full and final settlement for the land.

Allowing these new immigrants to settle in their territory offered a range of potential benefits to Temne leaders, particularly in the form of annual tribute or rent payments and regular gifts.²⁷ Landlord-stranger arrangements with Europeans, whereby an African leader took responsibility for their guests, were very familiar on this stretch of coastline as there had already been more than three centuries of trading contact by the time the “Black Poor” arrived in 1787.²⁸ The Temne leaders who made their marks on the treaties of 1787 and 1788 were all slave traders from the southern shore of the Sierra Leone estuary. Naimbana, regent of the Koya Temne, and the most important signatory in 1788, lived only nine miles down

river from Bunce Island (referred to as “Benshali” by Temne in the twentieth century), but he had no sovereignty over the island and received no annual payment from its British occupants.²⁹ Pa Samma of the Bullom Shore, on the north of the Sierra Leone estuary, received one hundred bars a year in payments for Bunce Island, Tasso Island, Tombo and Bob’s Island. In an agreement dated 3 April 1792, John and Alexander Anderson, merchants of London, offered Pa Samma, described as “King of the North Bulloms,” a further thirty bars a year to secure the use of the “several Islands of Marrabump, Caffoo, Papell, Callumbay and Batt Island, situate, lying and being in the River Sierra Leone.” The payments made to Pa Samma were described as “yearly rents” in the agreement.³⁰ It was agreed that Pa Samma would receive another six bars for every vessel calling at Bunce Island, with the exception of the Andersons’ own craft. Pa Samma received a present of ten shillings to accompany the signing of this agreement, and John Tilley and John Ballingall, agents at Bunce Island, witnessed his mark on the document.³¹

As Dorjahn and Fyfe explain, local leaders were anxious to have European traders in their town and to retain them there.³² King Naimbana recognised the advantages to be gained from having a large trading settlement under his control to rival Bunce Island. The number of people who disembarked in 1787 suggested that the new town would be a far larger commercial undertaking, offering the potential for strengthening Naimbana’s bargaining position by playing off different European traders against each other. Even after the losses from disease and desertion, those surviving in 1788 far outnumbered the resident population at the slave fort.³³ Welcoming these strangers offered the prospect of bringing “fresh ideas, energy, ambition,” as well as European goods of value to the local populace.³⁴ Temne leaders who signed the treaties would have expected to have preferential access to a range of material goods to enhance their personal appearance and homes, as noted in the case of Benguela in West Central Africa.³⁵ Naimbana, as Ijagbemi points out, was convinced that his country

would prosper from the presence of the new settlement.³⁶ He may well have anticipated that allowing the strangers to settle would have brought enhanced wealth and influence for the Koya Temne at a time when they had experienced considerable losses elsewhere in their territory. The Temne had lost control of important areas of trading at Port Loko (Bake Loko), which had come under Susu influence by the mid eighteenth century. The Susu built a town called Sendugu, which expanded rapidly, reflecting the importance of Port Loko as a trading area providing access to the coast and inland routes to Fuuta Jalon. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Loko had forced the Temne out from profitable areas of trading on the Rokel River.³⁷

When later Company officials attempted to negotiate for more land to establish plantations, it became clear that one hundred bars was the standard annual payment expected. Nine years later, Zachary Macaulay, acting Governor of Sierra Leone, provided some broad approximation of the sterling equivalent of one hundred bars, estimating that it was worth £13.³⁸ As the goods given to King Tom in 1787 were worth around £58, this may have been seen as a generous first payment of more than four hundred bars. Similarly in 1788, Captain Taylor of the brig *Myro* estimated that he had used goods to the value of £85 1s 7d to ratify the second treaty with King Naimbana.³⁹ This later payment of more than six hundred bars may also have given King Naimbana and King Jimmy, King Tom's successor at Ro Fransa, the impression that establishing a relationship with the new settlement would be highly advantageous.

III

At the same time as welcoming these potential trading partners, Temne leaders asserted clearly and repeatedly the terms on which the settlers at Granville Town, later re-developed as the site of Freetown, were permitted to remain in their territory. A series of major

conferences over land from 1788 onwards reveal growing Temne dissatisfaction about the behavior of their tenants.⁴⁰ Payments of tribute, and hence sovereignty and control of land, were the source of repeated disagreements in these palavers, but issues of security and territorial control also emerged as prominent concerns by the late 1790s. Even so, the Temne were prepared to be flexible in the negotiation of the landlord-stranger relationship. They did not have a static view of how it should operate, and on a number of occasions offered concessions to Company officials.⁴¹

The question of annual payments did not become a major point of contention in the first few years of settlement. The British were content that they had bought the land, while the Temne understood that they had received appropriate, even generous, payments in 1787 and 1788, which duly acknowledged their sovereignty over the land. They assumed that they would receive future annual payments in line with usual practice on the coast. The issue which triggered the first major palaver with the settlement in 1788 was the invalid status of the first treaty signed by King Tom (also referred to as King Cojou) the previous year.⁴² The problems associated with the conduct of the treaty negotiations in 1787 have been identified clearly by various writers; as the fact that Thompson had initiated, and concluded, negotiations with King Tom, a local leader subordinate to Naimbana, meant that a further palaver was needed the following year to resolve the political difficulties created by Thompson's diplomatic blunder.⁴³ A new treaty signed by King Naimbana on 22 August 1788 included a statement repudiating the previous agreement:

This is to certify to all to whom these presents may come. That we whose names are hereunto subscribed, maketh Oath That the purchase of the Land &c. made by Captain Thompson was not (to our certain knowledge) valid, It having been purchased ffrom people who had no authority to sell the same.⁴⁴

According to Lieutenant John Incledon Webber of HMS *Pomona*, who visited Granville Town in the first week of September 1788, King Naimbana insisted that the agreement was renewed after the death of King Tom. Webber reported how Naimbana later informed Governor Lucas, that, “King Cojou had no right to dispose of the ground it being part of his Kingdom...”⁴⁵ Naimbana was given goods worth over £85 to confirm the terms of the new treaty, including food, wine, clothing, pistols, a “Tellscope”, two pairs of gold earrings and necklaces, seven muskets and a “Box of Smoaking Pipes.”⁴⁶ By insisting on the signing of a second treaty, Naimbana was confirming his right to control settlement in Temne territory.

A further dispute arose within a couple of weeks following the signing of the second treaty. On or about Monday 8 September 1788, a palaver was held regarding a “misunderstanding that prevail[e]d between the colony and the King of Robana [Naimbana] relative to the watering place.” Webber, who was there to deliver copies of the Dolben Act to slave traders on the coast, noted that tensions had escalated to such a level that Naimbana “had threatened to burn the Colony unless immediately complied [*sic*] with.”⁴⁷ As a result, a “very grand palaver” was held at the court house in Granville Town, attended by King Naimbana and the “young king Cojou” (also known as King Jimmy), who had succeeded King Tom on his death. At this palaver, attended by all the captains of merchant ships in the harbour, it was agreed to pay Naimbana the goods he demanded to ratify “the treaty afrish [*sic*].” The king was given a “Cask of rum, Tobaco [*sic*] and powder with some flints and slops [*sic*],” which Webber considered essential to maintain “tranquillity” in the colony.⁴⁸

Not all problems could be resolved by negotiation. On occasions, matters were sufficiently serious to justify the use of violence, a common negotiating strategy in trading relationships on the upper Guinea coast.⁴⁹ Violence was also a feature of conflicts over land in West Central Africa and the Cape peninsula.⁵⁰ The destruction of one of King Jimmy’s towns by the crew of HMS *Pomana* in November 1789 led him to respond in kind, and he

burnt down Granville Town the following month.⁵¹ Even so, his attack serves to emphasise how the Temne had shown considerable flexibility in their dealings with the strangers over the preceding two and a half years.

After Alexander Falconbridge was sent out by the St. George's Bay Company to gather the settlers dispersed in the attack, the main issue at stake in a lengthy palaver in February 1791 was whether Temne leaders would collectively agree to the surviving settlers re-establishing their town. At this palaver, held at King Naimbana's town at Robana, disagreement among the gathered Temne leaders meant that negotiations stretched out over five or six days. After kneeling before the Naimbana and presenting him with kola, King Jimmy delivered a loud and lengthy address.⁵² The content of his speech is not recorded in Anna Maria Falconbridge's account, but his views no doubt influenced the decision not to allow the settlers to return to the original site of Granville Town. As a result, Falconbridge re-established the settlers on a site on Cline Bay located three or four miles to the east of the original Granville Town.⁵³ Even after King Jimmy had lost patience with the behaviour of his near neighbors, Temne leaders were still prepared to allow the settlement to be re-founded, albeit in a different location.

Land ownership emerged as an important issue of debate in the days leading up to this palaver at Robana. Naimbana explained in clear and unequivocal terms to Falconbridge that he did not have the right to sell the land, and that any agreement to "allow strangers to come and live among us" required the consent of all his people. After the palaver confirmed that the settlers could remain in Temne territory, goods worth about £30 were used to ratify the new agreement. This payment led Granville Sharp and other European sponsors to insist that the same area of Temne land had now been purchased several times over for George III.⁵⁴ By the time John Clarkson arrived at Freetown with over eleven hundred black Loyalist settlers from Nova Scotia in March 1792, the directors of the Sierra Leone Company had obviously

briefed him on this point. As a result, he steadfastly refused to make any further payments to the Temne. This obdurate refusal by British officials to accept the need to make annual payments to their Temne “landlords,” an issue spelled out clearly to them in successive palavers, laid the foundations for later conflict. All that mattered to British officials was that they had a document, which they considered a valid legal instrument, referring to the sale of land and, as far as they were concerned, this superseded any local practice and negotiations at palavers.⁵⁵

Whatever the wording of the treaty, written out by British negotiators in 1787 and 1788, Temne leaders understood that in line with customary practice, they had agreed to lease an area of land for an annual payment, and that there was no suggestion that they had relinquished sovereignty.⁵⁶ As Renner-Thomas points out, “there is no doubt that they did not appreciate, or at least did not accept, the outright alienation of their lands.”⁵⁷ Sharp was fully aware that the outright purchase of land was an abnormal arrangement. In his pamphlet entitled *Free English Territory in Africa*, first published in 1790, he recognised how forts established by external traders “have generally been only *rented* of the native Chiefs.”⁵⁸ He argued that, in contrast, “the new District at *Sierra Leona* has been actually purchased, and is given up by the native Chiefs, (under a ratified Charter,) from themselves and their Heirs for ever, to the Crown of England....” He was adamant that this meant that the land was no longer Temne land, but had become “*English Territory*.”⁵⁹ Based on the wording of the treaties, Sharp believed that they had purchased an area “nearly twice as large as the valuable Island of Barbadoes” for less than £150.⁶⁰ As a result, officials sent out from Britain insisted that they should not be expected to keep paying for land that had already been purchased.

Sharp adopted a self-congratulatory tone when he explained to one of his correspondents how they had managed to purchase an extensive area of fine land for a “trifling expense.”⁶¹ The paltry nature of the payment subsequently became clear in later

negotiations for the purchase of the “Island of Bananas,” located off the south-western tip of the Sierra Leone peninsula. In negotiations with Stephen Caulker, the Acting Governor, John Gray, was astonished to learn that the sum demanded for the western half of the Banana Islands was £10,000. He repeatedly asked Caulker to propose a lower sum, but this was refused. In a letter dated 16 July 1799, Caulker explained that, “as you are so desiring to know my price, I shall let you have half of the Bananas for £10,000 Sterling, and not under, that is to be the western side, the Eastern side I wish to keep....” In his response six days later, Gray stated that he was not prepared to pay that sum and proposed a yearly rent of 500 bars a year for an area of “2 square miles and a half.” This acceptance of the need to make annual payments was out of line with the attitude of British officials to the land immediately around Freetown, but it reflected an understanding that if they were to obtain more land, they would need to conform with local practice. Gray expressed impatience with Caulker’s “extravagant demand,” pointing out that, “Had your land been in England, or in the West Indies, it might probably be worth near the money you mention; but here, you know, it is quite a different matter.”⁶²

From 1792, the question of annual payments dominated most subsequent palavers. The refusal by Company officials to pay an annual tribute raised wider and more fundamental issues about African sovereignty and the control of land on the peninsula. At his first palaver with King Naimbana and King Jimmy in March 1792, Clarkson ridiculed them for asking for payment again. He addressed King Jimmy directly and asked him why he had called a “fool palaver” to ask them to buy the land again. He used the hypothetical example of a king who had paid an agreed amount for a slave and some rice, and then the seller returned the “next Moon” and asked for payment again. He obviously thought he had won his point, as he noted the laughter which brought the palaver to an end.⁶³ When the question of payment was raised again at a palaver at Harmony Hall in Freetown on 27 and 28 September 1792, Clarkson

produced a copy of the treaty and pointed out to King Naimbana his signature on the document, again emphasising that this was a “fool palaver.”⁶⁴ As far as the Temne were concerned, this palaver left matters unresolved and King Naimbana concluded by saying that a further meeting was required at Signor Domingo’s town.⁶⁵

By the time Clarkson left Freetown for a period of home leave in December 1792, he appears to have grasped the central problem causing friction over land with neighboring Temne. At a meeting of the Governor and Council on 12 December 1792, he instructed William Dawes to re-open negotiations for all the land for the Sierra Leone Company and advised that he should reach an agreement based “rather on the terms of an annual rent for ever, then paying down the sum of purchase at once.”⁶⁶

Clarkson’s instructions went unheeded, and the issue of payment for land came to the fore again with the death of the regent, Naimbana, and the election of Bai Farma as king of the Koya Temne in January 1794. As part of the landlord-stranger relationship, it was expected that agreements were renewed on the election of a new king. At a palaver two months later, Bai Farma insisted that the land belonged to him and could not be transferred to anyone else. He stated that “he was determined to have his Customs for all vessels and that we must pay him for his country & pay him for his Customs.” He informed Governor Dawes that he expected to be paid 100 bars a year for the land, as well as receiving payments for the Company’s ships for anchoring and watering in the bay.⁶⁷ Yet again, Governor Dawes repeated the set speech of Company officials that they would not pay twice for the land. He sidestepped direct confrontation, however, by agreeing to give the king one hundred bars annually, as the king requested, if he appointed a landlord for Freetown. Reports of the palaver by Macaulay, second member of Council, who was present at Robaga, indicate that Bai Farama was losing patience with the settlement. He complained that when the settlers first arrived, “we did good to the Country. Made trade & gave good price but now we did bad

we gave bad price. Sent our goods to other countries & every body, white men too, said we wished to take the Country.”⁶⁸ He warned Dawes and Macaulay to be afraid of him, as “His Devil can kill us all.”⁶⁹

Having received assurances that he would be paid one hundred bars annually, Bai Farma [also King Firama] may have concluded this palaver satisfied that matters about his annual tribute had been resolved. However, as far as Company officials were concerned the payment was not for use of the land, nor was it an acknowledgement of Bai Farma’s sovereignty. They said they were prepared to pay for services rendered, and as such, they regarded the payment as conditional on the behavior of Bai Farma and King Jimmy, their newly appointed landlord. This arrangement broke down within less than a year. Bai Farma was aggrieved about various issues, including rumors that Macaulay had said he was “good for nothing,” and treated his messengers with contempt when they requested alcohol for him.⁷⁰

Bai Farma also complained that he had not been given any say in matters in the colony following the riot by settlers in June 1794. He expected to have been consulted as blood had been “spilt upon the king’s ground and he must have satisfaction for it.”⁷¹ As a result, he ordered the seizure of two Company vessels, the *Duke of Clarence* and the *Speculator*, which were being careened at Gambia Island in the mouth of the Bunce River. James Watt, a former plantation overseer, was sent to attend a palaver with Bai Farma and his leading headmen at Robaga in October 1794. Watt’s comment that Bai Farma had protected the settlement as well as a “Leopard take care of Goat” further inflamed tensions. The atmosphere deteriorated rapidly, the meeting at the Palaver House broke down without a clear resolution, and Bai Farma detained Watt as a prisoner for several days.⁷² Bai Farma’s exclusion from matters of justice in the colony continued to rankle. In a palaver at Ro Fransa in December 1796, he again complained that he had not been allowed to intervene between

the governor and the insurgents more than two years earlier. Macaulay rejected his right to intervene in colonial matters, but conceded that he could have a say in any disputes that arose between the Temne and settlers. This discussion broadened out into a wider complaint by Bai Farma that the settlement did not treat him respectfully as their “Father,” and had neglected him by failing to send him little presents, as children should do for their father. Macaulay retorted that the king had not behaved as their father and, although he did not say so directly, the clear implication was that he thought Bai Farma did not deserve presents.⁷³

Relationships deteriorated further in palavers held over the next three years. On 1 June 1797, the second King Tom (King Jimmy’s successor) visited Freetown and again explained that no one had the right to alienate any part of the country to the settlement. Any sale of land, he explained, was unlawful and “now void.” After a long speech in which he set out his version of events over the previous five years, Macaulay concluded by saying that any private laws among the Temne were a matter of indifference and had no bearing on the question. Just over three weeks later, King Tom again asked for payment for the country and Macaulay strenuously resisted his claim. Discussions continued into early July. In response to further requests for payment from Bai Farma and King Tom, Macaulay stated that he would not pay any more money and he would not give up an inch of the land that they had bought.⁷⁴ Agreement was reached that King Tom would receive one hundred dollars each year for his role as landlord, but Macaulay withheld this payment in January 1798 until the dispute over the western boundary of the colony had been resolved.⁷⁵

The western boundary, the direction from which King Jimmy had attacked Granville Town in 1789, was a major point of contention between 1792 and 1801. At the palaver in Freetown in September 1792, attended by King Naimbana, Signor Domingo and Pa Will, King Jimmy insisted that the western boundary line should be altered so that the watering place to the west of King Jimmy’s creek (later named Sanders Brook) reverted to his

control.⁷⁶ Clarkson refused to give up any of the land to the west, and also rejected a request to relinquish control of an area on their eastern boundary. Although the Temne offered other land in exchange, Clarkson rejected their request citing the earlier agreement made by Thompson. He refused on the basis that the land was unsuitable. He also pointed out that:

when I received my orders in England for coming here, a chart was shown me, which determine the company's bound[a]ries as they are described in their agreement with Captain Thompson, together with all the purchase documents; that I was so far accountable for preserving them, and that it would be descreditable [*sic*] in me were I to lessen the district after such an agreement had been ratified by all parties.⁷⁷

The western boundary was still in dispute in March 1799. King Tom was insistent that the Company should not attempt to use any land to the west of King Jimmy's brook, and that the boundary line should follow the line of the brook. The Company insisted that the boundary started in St. George's Bay and ran in a straight line to the west of the brook, giving the Company a greater area of land to the west of Freetown. Governor Macaulay again resorted to taking out the original agreements made with King Jimmy from 1792 to prove the Company's right to occupy the land west of the brook, but King Tom refused to acquiesce, threatening them with serious consequences if they opposed him on this issue.⁷⁸

In order to settle the western boundary in 1800, the Governor and Council proposed evicting King Tom from his land. It was resolved that if King Tom refused to comply with their requests to settle the boundary, they would make an application to Bai Farma to expel him from his town. This was justified on the basis that King Tom lived too near Freetown, and was thwarting their plans.⁷⁹ The agreement by the Temne to lease the Company a further area of land at Pirates Bay (also Cockle Bay) on 23 October 1799 had generated new areas of disagreement. This land, situated on the western side of Ro Fransa, meant that King Tom was

bounded on both sides by land occupied by the Company. Although the Minutes of the Governor and Council stated that Bai Farma had leased this land for two hundred bars a year with the consent of his deputy King Tom, disagreements flared up within two months. On 10 December 1799, Governor Ludlam reported that, “various objections being subsequently started by the Natives ... threatened to render the quiet possession of it doubtful.”⁸⁰ Tensions had increased further in the lead up to settler rebellion of September 1800, as King Tom threatened to intervene if the Company failed to bring the trouble under control.⁸¹

IV

Company attempts to allocate promised plots to the Nova Scotian settlers had far-reaching consequences for the Temne. Frequent complaints were raised about the “strangers” using and altering the land in ways that interfered with their own farming and spiritual practices.⁸² Schemes of land clearance around Granville Town and Freetown by Richard Pepys, Company surveyor, were disruptive and prompted a series of complaints by Temne leaders in September 1792. The programme of land clearance had begun in earnest at least six months earlier following the arrival of over eleven hundred Nova Scotian settlers, and Clarkson noted the rapid progress of labourers in cutting down woodland, keeping the valuable logs and burning discarded vegetation.⁸³ In cutting roads and felling trees, Company officials showed no understanding of how the Temne believed that some areas of their land were sacred. Areas they considered to be occupied by spirits were to be left undisturbed, as in the Gambia River basin.⁸⁴ King Jimmy pleaded in 1792 that land to the west of Freetown should be returned to him on the basis that it was “holy ground.” The watering place near King Jimmy’s town was used to “make sacrifices to a large black snake living under one of the trees, for the continuance of the spring, which otherwise would dry up and distress the country.” Other areas of holy ground were discussed, as Clarkson agreed that no more trees would be cut down on land regarded as sacred. These problems were not resolved, however. On 4 October

1792, some of King Jimmy's people encountered Pepys and his working party in the woods and "forbad [*sic*] their cutting roads."⁸⁵

In cutting roads, Pepys showed no respect for Temne villages and plantations. In a wood to the east of Freetown, he came across a rice plantation on the course of his intended route. Despite the protests of local inhabitants, the surveyor expressed his determination to cut through the field on the basis that the Company owned the land and could do with it as it pleased. In his report of proceedings, Clarkson gave the impression that he was unaware of Temne dissatisfaction on this issue. However, more than six weeks earlier, he had recorded in his diary how differences had arisen with neighbouring Temne as the work of "running our lines into the country" had interfered with their plantations.⁸⁶ At the palaver, Clarkson offered reassurances that they would not interfere with the cultivated land and villages of local inhabitants but would go around them. This promise was not adhered to in practice. When Clarkson advised William Dawes about the importance of laying out the lots of lands for the Nova Scotian settlers in October 1792, he pointed out that if they should encounter any "houses of the natives" they should persuade them to relinquish their position with a "trifling present for their loss." This instruction to Dawes was based on the assumption that this was Company land, and it was incumbent upon local people to vacate the land when required to do so.⁸⁷ Concerns about disturbances to towns and plantations on the eastern boundary of land leased by the Company were raised again in January 1801, as the cutting of roads and boundary lines interfered with Pa Dick's town and "cut off plantations belonging to the town."⁸⁸ Company officials were more concerned though with the ways in which the Temne disturbed their plans. When the Company leased further land at Pirates Bay in October 1799, they included a statement in the agreement with Bai Farma that none of his people were henceforth allowed within the boundaries of the land for "making their Lougars, or for any

other purpose whatever.”⁸⁹ The reason given for this innovation in practice was to prevent any disturbances to the Company and its people.⁹⁰

King Jimmy and Signor Domingo were also alarmed that woodland clearance weakened the defensive positions of their towns and exposed them to attack. Clarkson noted how Signor Domingo, whose town lay approximately four miles east of Freetown, was “disturbed at the idea of the country being thus laid open, as it might enable us in time to oppress the inhabitants.”⁹¹ The cutting of roads across Temne territory raised concerns that the Company was planning to make war on them, and that road construction was a “prelude to our taking possession of the whole Cape and country.”⁹² Local fears that the immigrants intended to exert control over the territory were drawn to Clarkson’s attention in March 1792.⁹³ Eighteen months later, Pa Kokelly, who assumed the title of King Tom after the death of King Jimmy, set out his concerns to Macaulay.⁹⁴ He was worried that the settlement was going to bring in more people, and “become too strong and take the country from them.” He pointed out that their neighbors laughed at them for “giving away their country, and advising them while it was yet time to think of recovering it.”⁹⁵

King Tom and Bai Farma both made it clear to Governor Macaulay in July 1797 that they were alarmed by the clearance of land in the hills above Freetown. Not only did they regard this as an unlawful encroachment “on the Mountain land,” but they were fearful that the construction of a house there would provide a commanding position over their towns. King Tom explained they were worried that cannon would be used to drive them out from their towns.⁹⁶ There was some justification for this concern. In the process of negotiating for land between Whiteman’s Bay and Pirates Bay in October 1799, it was noted by Company officials that the land provided clear strategic opportunities for the “complete command” of a large stretch of coastline from west to east along the peninsula. On 10 December 1799, the Governor and Council noted how this land should be protected with a few guns, which

“would lay open to us the whole coast, and the native towns situate thereon, from Cape Sierra Leone to Sign[o]r Domingo’s.”⁹⁷

By the end of September 1801, rumors had started to spread that an attack on Freetown was imminent. A “body of natives armed with muskets” was reported moving through the town at midnight. As a result, the Governor and Council stipulated that no “native-strangers” were allowed to carry arms, and that this news should be communicated to the Temne, and especially to King Tom.⁹⁸ Growing tensions over land culminated in the Temne attacking Freetown on 18 November 1801. In the early hours of the morning, “a Body of Natives drawn together by kings Firama and Tom, Prince Tom, Banna Compa and other headmen of the Timmany nation” attacked Fort Thornton with the support of two rebel settlers who had fled from Freetown after the insurrection against the Company in September 1800.⁹⁹ A number of soldiers and settlers drove back the attackers using bayonets. Governor Dawes was wounded in the attack, and Richard Crankapone, one of the black settlers from Nova Scotia, sustained mortal wounds. After the attack was repelled, the Company used a combined force of Jamaican Maroon settlers, soldiers, mariners from HMS *Wasp*, Kru and other Africans sympathetic to the colony to attack villages lying to the west of Freetown.¹⁰⁰ Within the space of two weeks, they had driven out the Temne “from the District which lies between the Settlement and Cape Sierra Leone....”¹⁰¹ Ro Fransa, formerly King Jimmy’s town, was destroyed together with other villages and farms.¹⁰²

After fleeing to Maligia on the Melakori River, approximately 60 miles to the north-east of Freetown, King Tom secured additional support from his son-in-law, Fatima Foday (also Foudy), a headman at Maligia. With this support, King Tom attacked Freetown again on 11 April 1802. The attack launched from the east was quickly repelled, after which King Tom returned to Maligia under the protection of Fatima Foday.¹⁰³ When Richard Bright, a member of Council at Freetown, was sent to Forekaria in September 1802 to bring back King Tom

and the settlers who had supported the attacks, he took the opportunity to represent the Temne as the aggressors.¹⁰⁴ At a palaver at Forekaria attended by more than 40 people, he insisted that King Tom had no cause for complaint and was interested only in plundering the colony. Bright also took the opportunity to emphasise that the colony, protected by King George III, was working in the interests of its African neighbors by introducing agricultural improvements and that it would be detrimental to the interests of the country if it fell into the hands of King Tom.¹⁰⁵

In a highly selective account of the long-running disagreements over land, Bright argued that the colony's "love of peace" meant that they had made every effort to accommodate King Tom's demands about the western boundaries of the territory. The blame for the conflict was placed firmly on the Temne, who Bright described as "the savages in our neighbourhood."¹⁰⁶ Reports written by Company officials emphasised that the aggression was "exclusively attributed to the Timmanys...." The explanation in a later Company report that "no subject of dispute previously existed" with the Temne was entirely false.¹⁰⁷ Tensions over land had been mounting for some time, even though Temne leaders had made their points about land abundantly clear since 1788. Even so, it is striking just how quickly this process of Temne displacement occurred.

V

In 1792, the directors of the Sierra Leone Company issued almost three quarters of a million bronze and silver coins featuring an image of black and white hands clasped in friendship on the reverse.¹⁰⁸ Within the space of ten years, Company officials in Freetown came to regard the Temne as their enemy, and took swift and aggressive measures to expel them from large areas of the peninsula. It was reported on 12 January 1803 how, "the conquest was made by the taking and destroying of every town belonging to the Enemy, and the expulsion of every

Timmany Inhabitant.”¹⁰⁹ Even so, the Company continued to order batches of more coins with over 11,000 silver ones issued between 1802 and 1805.¹¹⁰ Company officials blamed the breakdown in their “friendship” on the hostility of the Temne, and insisted that they had been provoked into retaliatory action.¹¹¹ Evidence drawn from reports of successive palavers indicates, however, that it was the behavior of Company officials towards their Temne landlords over the previous decade which had created the conditions for conflict. Moreover, Macaulay was among those who acknowledged in the early 1790s that the Temne only resorted to war as a last resort when all other options had failed.¹¹²

As a result of the treaty agreed between Company officials and Bai Farma and King Tom on 10 July 1807, the Company took control of an even larger area of the coastline than had been specified in the treaty with Naimbana in August 1788. Six months before the settlement was transferred to British Crown control on 1 January 1808, the treaty confirmed that territory to the west of Freetown was surrendered to “His Majesty the King of Great Britain, for the use and benefit of the Sierra Leone Company.” On the east and south-east side, restrictions were imposed on the building of any new Temne settlements within eight miles of Freetown. No settlement was to be built closer than Robis, located between the present-day settlements of Wellington and Hastings, although exceptions were made for Salt Town and Ro-Cupra.¹¹³ The treaty was described as one of “Peace and Alliance,” but this conceals the devastation caused to the Koya Temne by the loss of their land. As the Temne, in common with people in the Gambia River basin, conceived of their land in “social, spiritual and political ways,” they were deprived of much more than an economic resource.¹¹⁴ They lost access to land they regarded as sacred, including the brook and woodland separating Freetown from Ro Fransa, a site which various Temne leaders had tried to protect at palavers from 1792 onwards.¹¹⁵

Company officials admitted in a report to parliament in 1802 that their direct influence extended only as far as the Temne. However, after the deployment of Royal Navy patrols at Freetown in 1808, William Roscoe, the Liverpool abolitionist, and a subscriber to the African Institution, argued for a robust military intervention along the coast of West Africa. He prepared a thirty-four page justification of why British ships should be able to intercept the slaving vessels of any nation, irrespective of whether they were at war with Britain. His letter to William Frederick, second duke of Gloucester and Edinburgh, President of the African Institution, did not refer to making attacks on slave factories on land to release enslaved Africans, but incursions into African territory could have been easily justified using the ideas contained in his report.¹¹⁶ The annual report of the African Institution in 1814 noted with some satisfaction that Governor Maxwell had “proceeded up the Rio Pongas, for the purpose of rooting out the Slave traders in that river,” and had succeeded in destroying several Slave Factories” in this area located approximately 140 miles north of Freetown.¹¹⁷ These types of direct interventions in African territory prompted a letter of complaint from Alimamy Amara (also King Amra), ruler of the Muslim state of Moria, the capital of which was at Forekaria, located approximately sixty miles north-east of Freetown.¹¹⁸ On 2 March 1814, he pointed out that Governor Maxwell had no right to interfere with traders who came to their coast for slaves, as they were under his protection. In common with the points that Temne leaders had made repeatedly to Company officials, Amara reminded Maxwell that, “You are the ‘Stranger’ [guest] ... we are the proprietors.”¹¹⁹

The token struck in 1814, the same year that Amara wrote to Maxwell, highlights how suppression policies aimed to disrupt slave supply from inland areas to the coast. Without any direct influence in Fuuta Jalon, the main source of supply of slaves to the coast, the Colony tried to spread its message using written and visual forms of propaganda.¹²⁰ In the annual report of the African Institution for 1814, it was explained that the tokens “exhibit

appropriate devices, and inscriptions in Arabic; and it is hoped that their distribution amongst the native Africans may not be without its use in promoting still further the abolition of the Slave Trade.”¹²¹ The Soho Mint produced 50,000 of the tokens with a collective face value of just over £200.¹²² These tokens carried an Arabic inscription on the reverse, intended to discourage inland traders from bringing their slave caravans to the coast:

Wudira [<i>sic</i>] bay‘	وُدِرَ [وَرْدُ بَيْعِ
al-‘abīd fī al-ingland	العبيد في الإنجلند
fī 1807 min al-sanat al-‘īsuwiyat [<i>sic</i>]	في ١٨٠٧ من السنة العيسويّة
fī ‘ahd al-sultān George al-thālith	في عهد السلطان جارج الثالث
īnā kullu ikhwat	إنّا كلّ إخوة

The inscription stated that, “Declaration prohibiting the sale of slaves in England in 1807 in the year of the al-Isawiyat [Gregorian calendar] during the reign of George III. We are all brethren!” The standard of Arabic on the tokens is very poor, and indicates that the person who provided a literal translation of the English text had very limited understanding of the language. There are grammatical mistakes, as well as the use of incorrect terms.¹²³

Such mistakes were reflective of how British abolitionists, who had mostly not seen Africa with their own eyes, had a partial and distorted knowledge of African cultural and economic systems. Officials at Freetown were typically dismissive of Temne attempts to resolve issues through palaver, and had little respect for the practice, seeing it as a forum for “jabbering,” drinking and time-wasting.¹²⁴ The Temne encounter with British abolitionists illustrates how the latter were prepared to disregard local rights, cultural practices and beliefs in their attempts to advance their self-appointed mission of reform in West Africa. By the first decade of the nineteenth century, British abolitionists clearly regarded the removal of the Temne from their land as acceptable collateral damage within their wider objective of eradicating the slave trade.

¹ Suzanne Schwarz is Professor of History at the University of Worcester, and a Vice President of the Hakluyt Society. She recently contributed a chapter entitled “Adaptation in the Aftermath of Slavery: Women, Trade and Property in Sierra Leone, c. 1790-1812” to *African Women in the Atlantic World. Property, Vulnerability & Mobility, 1660-1880* edited by Mariana P. Candido and Adam Jones (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2019). She is co-editor with Paul E. Lovejoy of *Slavery, Abolition and the Transition to Colonialism in Sierra Leone* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2015).

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Notes

² *Postscript to the Report of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company to the General Court, Held at London on Wednesday the 19th of October, 1791* (London: James Phillips, 1792), 4-7, 14.

³ For a discussion of this issue in historical literature, see Assan Sarr, *Islam, Power, and Dependency in the Gambia River Basin. The Politics of Land Control, 1790-1940* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2016), 3-5, 11.

⁴ Manuscript Orders and Regulations from the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, c. 1791, Sierra Leone Public Archives, Freetown [hereafter SLPA], 2-6. There are some similarities in ideas about land use with West Central Africa in the nineteenth century: Mariana Pinho Candido, "Conquest, Occupation, Colonialism and Exclusion: Land Disputes in Angola," in *Property Rights, Land and Territory in the European Overseas Empires*, eds. José Vicente Serrão, Bárbara Direito, Eugénia Rodrigues, Susana Münch Miranda (Lisbon: CEHC, ISCTE-IUL, 2014), 227-228.

⁵ *Substance of the Report of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company to the General Court, Held at London on Wednesday the 19th of October, 1791* (London: James Phillips, 1791), 3-4; *Postscript to the Report, 1791*, 5-6.

⁶ "Medal Commemorating the Abolition of the Slave Trade," National Maritime Museum, Greenwich: ZBA2808, <https://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/255111.html>; Sue Tugate, "Matthew Boulton and the Soho Mint: Copper to Customer," (PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 2010), 256 n. 947, 518; Robin Law, Suzanne Schwarz and Silke Strickrodt, "Introduction," in *Commercial Agriculture, the Slave Trade & Slavery in Atlantic Africa*, eds. Robin Law, Suzanne Schwarz & Silke Strickrodt (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2013), 1-6.

⁷ The Company report of 1804 anticipated that the abolition of the slave trade would release African labor for the purposes of cultivation. The directors presumably thought that Africans who would have been exported as slaves could be used for cultivation instead, although they did not consider the likelihood of them being kept in Africa as slaves. *Substance of the Report Delivered by the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, to the General Court of Proprietors, on Thursday the 29th March, 1804* (London: W. Phillips, 1804), 22-23, 57-58; Law, Schwarz and Strickrodt, "Introduction," 2.

⁸ *Eighth Report of the Directors of the African Institution, Read at the Annual General Meeting on the 23d of March, 1814* (London: Ellerton and Henderson, 1814), 16.

⁹ Suzanne Schwarz, "Commerce, Civilization and Christianity: The Development of the Sierra Leone Company," in *Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery*, eds. David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz and Anthony Tibbles, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 252-276; Suzanne Schwarz, "'A Just and Honourable Commerce': Abolitionist Experimentation in Sierra Leone in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," *African Economic History* 45, no. 1 (2017), 1-45.

¹⁰ Christopher Fyfe, ed., *Anna Maria Falconbridge: Narrative of Two Voyages to the River Sierra Leone during the Years 1791-1792-1793 and the Journal of Isaac DuBois with Alexander Falconbridge, An Account of the Slave Trade on the Coast of Africa* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 36-37, n. 34; Christopher Fyfe, ed., *"Our Children Free and Happy": Letters from Black Settlers in Africa in the 1790s* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), 19; Adeleye Ijagbemi, "The Kossoh War 1838-41: A Study in Temne/Colony Relations in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 5, no. 4 (1971), 549-550.

¹¹ *Substance of the Report, 1804*, 10-11, 15; "The Temne Attack on the Colony," in Christopher Fyfe, *Sierra Leone Inheritance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 126-127.

¹² Christopher Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 30, 33-34, 68, 70, 73-74, 76-77, 82, 95; Philip D. Curtin, *The Image of Africa. British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850* (London: Macmillan, 1965), 130-133.

¹³ Various forms of protest were used in Southern Ghana to oppose British colonial efforts to take possession of large areas of land in the late nineteenth century. Kwaku Nti, "This is Our Land: Land, Policy, Resistance, and Everyday Life in Colonial Southern Ghana, 1894-7," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 48, no. 1, (2012), 3-15; Olufemi Omosini, "The Gold Coast Land Question, 1894-1900: Some Issues Raised on West Africa's Economic Development," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 5, no. 3 (1972), 453-469.

¹⁴ In the early seventeenth century, the ruler of Benguela attacked Portuguese military forces. Mariana P. Candido, *An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World. Benguela and Its Hinterland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 8-9, 44-46; Mariana P. Candido and Adam Jones, "Introduction," *African Women in the Atlantic World. Property, Vulnerability & Mobility, 1660-1880*, eds. Mariana P. Candido and Adam Jones (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2019), 6; Candido, "Conquest, Occupation, Colonialism and Exclusion," 223, 226.

¹⁵ I am grateful for this information provided by Robin Law. Email correspondence, 4 June 2020.

¹⁶ Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell, "Landscape of Conquest: Frontier Water Alienation and Khoikhoi Strategies of Survival, 1652-1780," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, No. 4 (1992), 803-824.

¹⁷ The importance of tracing Temne influence is noted by Joseph J. Bangura, *The Temne of Sierra Leone. African Agency in the Making of a British Colony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). The methodological problems involved in using British accounts to trace African views is discussed in, Sarr, *Islam, Power, and Dependency*, 25-27.

¹⁸ Ijagbemi, "Kossoh War," 549-551. Kelley discusses the use of palavers in disputes arising from slave trading on the upper Guinea coast. Sean Kelley, "The Dirty Business of Panyarring and Palaver: Slave Trading on the Upper Guinea Coast in the Eighteenth Century," in *Slavery, Abolition and the Transition to Colonialism in Sierra Leone*, eds. Paul E. Lovejoy and Suzanne Schwarz (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2015), 98-103.

¹⁹ See, for example, Paul E. Lovejoy, *Slavery, Commerce and Production in the Sokoto Caliphate of West Africa* (Trenton: NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 153-206; Paul E. Lovejoy, "Plantations in the Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate," *Journal of African History* 19, no. 3 (1978), 341-368; Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Land Question in Early Colonial Northern Nigeria," in *Perspectives in African Historical Studies. Essays in Honour of Professor Chinedu Nwafor Ubah*, eds. Ojong Echum Tangban and Chukwuma C.C. Osakwe (Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2013), 667-688.

²⁰ Archival records from "Before the war, after the war: preserving history in Sierra Leone (EAP284)," <https://eap.bl.uk/project/EAP284/search>; Archival Records from "Nineteenth Century Documents of the Sierra Leone Public Archives (EAP443)," <https://eap.bl.uk/project/EAP443/search>. These projects have had the effect of stimulating new research, particularly on the Registers of Liberated Africans.

²¹ Fyfe, "Our Children," 3; Fyfe, *History*, 19.

²² "A Journal of the Proceedings on Board His Majestys Sloop the Nautilus – Tho[ma]s Boulden Thompson Esqr Commander kept by William Akers- Master, Commencing April 3rd 1787 Ending February 12th 1788," entry for 10 May 1787, The National Archives [hereafter TNA]: Admiralty: ADM 52/2421; Thomas Boulden Thompson, "A Journal of the Proceedings of His Majesty's Sloop Nautilus, under my command, commencing the 18th of January 1787, & ending the 17th of January 1788," TNA: Admiralty: ADM 51/627, 10 May, 25-26 May 1787 and 12 June 1787; Sheila Lambert, ed., *House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1975) 67, no. 1, 253.

²³ "The Treaty of 1787," in Fyfe, *Sierra Leone Inheritance*, 112-113. Queen Yammacouba's [also Yambacoubra] town was located approximately three miles west of the site of Freetown at Whiteman's Bay, and

Pa Bongee's town was approximately seven miles to the east on the Bunce River. *A Survey of the Entrance of Sierra Leona River, by Capt[ai]n Thompson of His Majesty's Ship Nautilus: to which is prefixed, the Directions taken from the Journal of Capt[ai]n George Young, of the Weasel* (London: Laurie and Whittle, 1794).

²⁴ "A Journal of the Proceedings of His Majesty's Sloop Nautilus, under my command," TNA: Admiralty: ADM 51/627, 10 May, 25-26 May and 12 June 1787; "A Journal of the Proceedings on Board His Majesty's Sloop the Nautilus," TNA: Admiralty: ADM 52/2421, 10-11 May, 25-26 May and 12 June 1787.

²⁵ Stephen J. Braidwood, *Black Poor and White Philanthropists. London's Blacks and the Foundation of the Sierra Leone Settlement 1786-1791* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1994), 180-185.

²⁶ "A Journal of the Proceedings of His Majesty's Sloop Nautilus, under my command," TNA: Admiralty: ADM 51/627, 12 June 1787.

²⁷ V.R. Dorjahn and Christopher Fyfe, "Landlord and Stranger: Change in Tenancy Relations in Sierra Leone," *Journal of African History* 3, no. 3 (1962), 391, 394-395, 397; Bruce L. Mouser, "Landlords-Strangers: A Process of Accommodation and Assimilation," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 8, no. 3 (1975), 425; Candido, "Conquest, Occupation, Colonialism and Exclusion," 223-233.

²⁸ E. A. Ijagbemi, "The Freetown Colony and the Development of 'Legitimate' Commerce in the Adjoining Territories," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 5, no. 2 (1970), 244; Walter Rodney, *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast 1545 to 1800* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 83-88; Mouser, "Landlords-Strangers," 429; Robin Law, "Before 1787: The First 325 years of Afro-European Interactions in Sierra Leone," Keynote Lecture at "Sierra Leone Past and Present," International Conference, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 2012.

²⁹ Fyfe, *Anna Maria Falconbridge*, 24; E. Ade. Ijagbemi, "A History of the Temne in the Nineteenth Century," (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1968), 47.

³⁰ Securing control of these islands was an attempt to increase their strategic influence in the slave trade. Kenneth C. Wylie, "The Slave Trade in Nineteenth Century Temneland and the British Sphere of Influence," *African Studies Review* 16, no. 2 (1973), 203, 207.

³¹ Northern Bullom Treaty, 3 April 1792, SLPA.

³² Dorjahn and Fyfe, "Landlord and Stranger," 394.

³³ Braidwood, *Black Poor*, 192-196.

³⁴ Sarr, *Islam, Power and Dependency*, 8-9.

³⁵ Mariana P. Candido, "Women's Material World in Nineteenth-Century Benguela," in *African Women*, 70-85.

³⁶ Ijagbemi, "Kossoh War," 549.

³⁷ Ijagbemi, "History of the Temne," iii, 9-10, 24, 27-30; C. Magbaily Fyle, *A Nationalist History of Sierra Leone* (Freetown, Sierra Leone: no publisher listed, 2011), 36, 40.

³⁸ Journal of Zachary Macaulay, March - May 1796, Huntington Library, San Marino, California [hereafter HL]: MY 418 (8), 43.

³⁹ Braidwood, *Black Poor*, 195.

⁴⁰ Dorjahn and Fyfe, "Landlord and Stranger," 395-396; Fyle, *Nationalist History*, 48.

⁴¹ Mouser, "Landlords-Strangers," 425-427, 440.

⁴² "Remarks on running down the coast of Affrica [*sic*] in H.M. Ship Pomona employed to deliver the late acts of parliament relative to the slave...", 27 August 1788 – 6 January 1789, North Devon Record Office [hereafter NDRO]: 3704M/05, 2-4.

⁴³ Fyle, *Nationalist History*, 48. Fyfe, *History*, 19-23; Ade Renner-Thomas, *Land Tenure in Sierra Leone. The Law, Dualism and the Making of a Land Policy* (Milton Keynes: AuthorHouse, 2010), 16-20, 54-56; Braidwood, *Black Poor*, 181-183.

⁴⁴ Treaty of 1788, SLPA. See also: "Treaty with the King and Chiefs of Sierra Leone. Cession, &c.," 22 August 1788, in *A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations at Present Subsisting Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers*, ed. Edward Hertslet. Vol. 14. (London: Butterworths, 1880), 927-928.

⁴⁵ "Remarks on running down the coast," 4.

⁴⁶ Treaty of 1788, SLPA.

⁴⁷ The Dolben Act restricted the number of enslaved Africans carried on board British slave ships in relation to the tonnage of the vessel. F. E. Sanderson, "The Liverpool Delegates and Sir William Dolben's Bill," *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire* 124 (1972), 57-84; David Richardson, "The Ending of the British Slave Trade in 1807: The Economic Context," in *The British Slave Trade: Abolition, Parliament and People* eds. Stephen Farrell, Melanie Unwin and James Walvin (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 136-137.

⁴⁸ The term "slop" is defined as "wide baggy trousers or breeches," and "clothes and bedding issued to seamen." "Remarks on running down the coast," 3-4.

⁴⁹ Kelley, "Panyarring and Palaver," 89-91.

⁵⁰ Guelke and Shell, "Landscape of Conquest," 806-808; Candido, "Conquest, Occupation, Colonialism and Exclusion," 223, 226.

⁵¹ Granville Sharp to William Pitt, 10 June 1790, Gloucestershire Record Office [hereafter GRO]: D3549/13/1/R10.

⁵² Winterbottom noted how, “Kola is always presented to the guests, in visits of ceremony or of friendship, and is looked upon as a mark of great politeness. It generally forms a part of every considerable present, and at public meetings, or palavers between different nations, it is a substitute for the olive branch.” Thomas Winterbottom, *An Account of the Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone. To Which is Added an Account of the Present State of Medicine Among them*, vol. I. eds. John D. Hargreaves and E. Maurice Backett (London: Frank Cass, 1969 [London, 1803]), 77; Rodney, *Upper Guinea Coast*, 206.

⁵³ This new settlement is usually stated to have been located at Fora Bay, but the position of Granville Town on a plan published by the Company is closer to present-day Cline Bay. “Plan of Sierra Leone and the Parts Adjacent, MDCCXCIV,” in *An Account of the Colony of Sierra Leone, From its First Establishment in 1793. Being the Substance of a Report Delivered to the Proprietors* (London: James Phillips, 1795).

⁵⁴ Granville Sharp to Henry Thornton, 29 November 1794, GRO: D3549/13/1/T6; Fyfe, *Anna Maria Falconbridge*, 26, 36.

⁵⁵ Copies of the “grants of Land from King Nambaina & King Jammy &c.” were sent out with the orders from the directors, Manuscript Orders and Regulations from the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, c. 1791, SLPA, 23. The importance of bureaucratic processes and paper in the making of the British Empire is discussed in, Clifton Crais, “Chiefs and Bureaucrats in the Making of Empire: A Drama from the Transkei, South Africa, October 1880,” *The American Historical Review* 108, No. 4 (2003), 1039, 1052-1053.

⁵⁶ Dorjahn and Fyfe, “Landlord and Stranger,” 391; Fyfe, “*Our Children*,” 14-15; Ijagbeme, “Freetown Colony,” 244-246. Braidwood, *Black Poor*, 185. Similar differences of interpretation occurred in Benguela. Candido, *African Slaving Port*, 8-9.

⁵⁷ Renner-Thomas, *Land Tenure*, 55, 59-60.

⁵⁸ In the late seventeenth century, English traders at Tantumkweri on the Gold Coast paid the Fante authorities goods to the value of £24 a year for groundrent. I am grateful to Robin Law for this information. Email correspondence, 4 June 2020.

⁵⁹ In an address “To the Maroons in the New English Settlement at Sierra Leone” in the early nineteenth century, Granville Sharp explained that “all the Land that has been purchased by the Company, under the Authority of an Act of Parliament & of a Royal Charter, ought to be considered as English Ground.”

“To the Maroons in the New English Settlement at Sierra Leone. The Address of Granville Sharp,” GRO: D3549/13/3/22, undated.

⁶⁰ Granville Sharp, *Free English Territory in Africa* [handwritten date of 1791], 1, 6-7.

⁶¹ Granville Sharp to J.C. Lettsom, 13 October 1788, in *Memoirs of Granville Sharp, Esq. Composed from his Own Manuscripts, and Other Authentic Documents in the Possession of his Family and of the African Institution* ed. Prince Hoare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015 [London: Henry Colburn, 1820]), 317.

⁶² Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1796-1799, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/4, 153v-163v.

⁶³ John Clarkson Diary, Vol. I, 19 March - 4 August 1792, University of Illinois, Chicago [hereafter UIC]: Sierra Leone Collection: Box 1, Folder 4, 58-65.

⁶⁴ J.L. Hart, “Diary of Lieutenant J. Clarkson R.N. (Governor, 1792),” *Sierra Leone Studies* (1927), 60.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 64

⁶⁶ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1792-1794, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/2, 36r.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 62r, 69v-70r; Zachary Macaulay’s Diary, 1 August 1793 - 16 April 1794, HL: MY 2, 77-78 (entry for 7 March 1794).

⁶⁸ In this context, “other countries” may refer to areas outside Temne territory.

⁶⁹ Zachary Macaulay’s Diary, 1 August 1793 - 16 April 1794, HL: MY 2, 77-78 (entry for 7 March 1794); Fyfe, *History*, 54.

⁷⁰ Journal of Zachary Macaulay, 1794, HL: MY 418 (3), 16-17, 56.

⁷¹ Journal of James Watt, 20-25 October 1794, HL: MY 418 (5), 5-6.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 4; Journal of Zachary Macaulay, 1794, HL: MY 418 (3), 56-60.

⁷³ Journal of Zachary Macaulay, December 1796 - February 1797, HL: MY 418 (18), 6.

⁷⁴ Journal of Zachary Macaulay, June 1797 - January 1798, HL: MY 418 (22), 1-7, 22-24.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁷⁶ Fyfe, *History*, 75.

⁷⁷ Hart, “Diary,” 61-63.

⁷⁸ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1796-1799, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/4, 135; Fyfe, *History*, 75.

⁷⁹ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1800-1801, TNA: Colonial Office, CO 270/5, 52r.

⁸⁰ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1796-1799, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/4, 173r.

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- ⁸¹ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1800-1801, TNA: Colonial Office, CO 270/5, 61; Bruce L. Mouser, ed., *Guinea Journals. Journeys into Guinea-Conakry during the Sierra Leone Phase, 1800-1821* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979), 12-13.
- ⁸² Ijagbemi, "History of the Temne," 65-68.
- ⁸³ John Clarkson Diary, Vol. I, 19 March - 4 August 1792, UIC, 15, 30.
- ⁸⁴ Sarr, *Islam, Power and Dependency*, 1-5.
- ⁸⁵ Hart, "Diary," 62-63, 71.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 75.
- ⁸⁸ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1800-1801, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/5, 85-86.
- ⁸⁹ This refers to the Portuguese term *lugar*, meaning village or place. Winterbottom, *Native Africans*, 46.
- ⁹⁰ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1796-1799, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/4, 166v.
- ⁹¹ Hart, "Diary," 63.
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, 61.
- ⁹³ John Clarkson Diary, Vol. I, 19 March - 4 August 1792, UIC, 11.
- ⁹⁴ Fyfe, *History*, 74.
- ⁹⁵ Suzanne Schwarz, ed., *Zachary Macaulay and the Development of the Sierra Leone Company, 1793-4: 1. Journal, June-October 1793*, University of Leipzig Papers on Africa, History and Culture, series no. 4 (Leipzig: University of Leipzig, 2000), 58.
- ⁹⁶ Journal of Zachary Macaulay, 1 June 1797 - 17 January 1798, HL: MY 418 (22), 22-24.
- ⁹⁷ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1796-1799, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/4, 165v, 174r.
- ⁹⁸ Sierra Leone Sessional Papers, Minutes of Council, 1801, TNA: Colonial Office: CO 270/6, 137v.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 154r; Mouser, *Guinea Journals*, 12-13.
- ¹⁰⁰ Fyfe, *History*, 90.
- ¹⁰¹ "Africa and the Atlantic Islands. iv. Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone Company, 1800-1807," TNA: War Office, WO 1/352, 12v, 14r, 15r.
- ¹⁰² Fyfe, *History*, 89-90.
- ¹⁰³ Mouser, *Guinea Journals*, 13, 35-36, 42-43, 60.
- ¹⁰⁴ Rewards were offered for the return of the men: 1000 bars for King Tom, 500 bars for Nathaniel Wansey and 200 bars for Daniel Carey. Mouser, *Guinea Journals*, 50-51, 63-65, 69-70, 75, 80-81, 93-94, 118-119.

¹⁰⁵ Mouser, *Guinea Journals*, 61-62.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 35, 44-46, 52.

¹⁰⁷ *Substance of the Report, 1804*, 10-11, 15.

¹⁰⁸ These included one penny, one cent, ten cents, twenty cents, fifty cents and one dollar coins. Tungate, "Matthew Boulton," 480, 521-522.

¹⁰⁹ "Africa and the Atlantic Islands. iv. Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone Company, 1800-1807," TNA: War Office, WO 1/352, 66r.

¹¹⁰ Tungate, "Matthew Boulton," 522.

¹¹¹ *Substance of the Report, 1804*, 14.

¹¹² Fyfe, *Anna Maria Falconbridge*, 107; Schwarz, *Zachary Macaulay*, 17. Disputes over boundaries and "reactions to expansionist political moves" were among some of the motives for war, both of which have some relevance to local reactions to the Company's intervention in Sierra Leone. Ade Ijagbemi, "Chiefs, Warriors, and the Europeans: Warfare and Diplomacy on the Rokel in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 10, no. 2 (1980), 16-17.

¹¹³ "Treaty between the Governor of Sierra Leone and King Firama and King Tom," 10 July 1807, in *Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions*, ed. Hertslet, 929-30; Ijagbemi, "Kossoh War," 550; *African Herald* 11 (2 December 1809), 35.

¹¹⁴ Sarr, *Islam, Power and Dependency*, 12-15. See also: Carola Lentz, *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), 7, 9, 15-17, 82-126.

¹¹⁵ In Southern Ghana, land was viewed as a "cultural and religious resource" which provided a link to their ancestors in daily life. Nti, "This is Our Land," 3, 12-13.

¹¹⁶ Copy of a Letter from Mr. William Roscoe to His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, undated, The Royal Archives, Windsor Castle: Gloucester Papers: GEO/ADD/23/87.

¹¹⁷ *Eighth Report of the Directors of the African Institution*, 4-5, 13; Mouser, *Guinea Journals*, 16-19; Register of Liberated Africans 1812-1814, SLPA, 4,684-4,923. The men, women and children "Seized at Rio Pongus by the Expedition, 1814" were numbered 4,684 to 4,923 in the Registers of Liberated Africans. They included Macai, a woman of fifty, who was described as having "lost nearly the whole of her fingers & toes."

¹¹⁸ Mouser, *Guinea Journals*, 6, 13; Bruce L. Mouser, "Moria Politics in 1814; Amara to Maxwell, March 2," *Bulletin de Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire* 35, Sér B, no. 4 (1973), 805-812.

¹¹⁹ Bruce L. Mouser, *American Colony on the Rio Pongo. The War of 1812, the Slave Trade, and the Proposed Settlement of African Americans, 1810-1830* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2013), 63-76; Mouser, *Guinea Journals*, 19; Mouser, “Moria Politics,” 809-812.

¹²⁰ Rodney, *Upper Guinea Coast*, 237-239.

¹²¹ *Eighth Report of the Directors of the African Institution*, 16.

¹²² Tungate, “Matthew Boulton,” 256 n. 947, 489, 518.

¹²³ Ismael Montana explains that, “one of its major mistakes is the use of ‘al-Isūwiyat’ in lieu of ‘al- mīlādiyya’ in reference to the Gregorian calendar. The correct rendering of this should have been ‘al-sannat al-mīlādiyya’ and not ‘al-sannat al-Isūwiyat.’” The final line of the inscription is also grammatically incorrect: “‘īnā kullu ikhwat’ should be ‘īnanā kullunā al-Ikhwat.’” Email correspondence, 20 May 2020.

¹²⁴ E.G. Ingham, *Sierra Leone after a Hundred Years* (London: Seeley and Co., 1894), 60. The palaver was often a “site of creative misunderstanding” between Africans and Europeans on the upper Guinea coast. Kelley, “Panyarring and Palaver,” 99-100.