“An insurance-based approach to improving SME Cyber Security”

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1. Abstract

There has been increasing concern in recent years about the lack of urgency in SMEs regarding security of their information. Concern stems not only from the risks the SMEs are taking not only with their own data, but also with the data they share with supply chain partners. Current surveys have shown that the situation is getting worse with human error compounded by cybercriminals exploiting weaknesses in SME systems and using them to hack supply chain hubs.

In this paper, a researcher and a practitioner from the UK investigate possible reasons for SME apparent lack of interest in securing data, or developing information security management systems (ISMSs). In the absence of UK legislation, the only way SMEs are likely en masse to improve their information security is through pressure from supply chain partners and particularly supply chain hubs. The authors present an interesting development in cyber liability insurance which provides the basis for a cost-effective solution that will encourage good information assurance across the supply chain.

The solution offered in association with a major International insurer is explained in detail in this paper. It has the dual advantages for participating SMEs of ensuring that they achieve a level of information assurance that will offer them actual protection, and at the same time provide them with insurance that will protect them financially against data breaches or other costly consequences of weak information security. The scheme used will provide actuarial evidence for the insurer to further refine the model. Clients that cannot show evidence of a base level of security will not get insurance cover; by contrast those assessed as being more secure will be eligible for a discount. The tool used in this model is a self-assessed version of the IASME or Cyber Essentials information assurance standards, both recently developed in the UK to meet the needs of SMEs wishing to safeguard their precious information but not possessing the resources to achieve the ISO27001 standard.

2. Background
Information security researchers and consultants around the world looked on with a degree of incredulity as the highly secure mainframe computer environments of the 1980s were gradually replaced by Local Area Networks (LANs) with localized data processing and storage. The biggest danger was that anyone could merely take a copy of a file of confidential data and save it under another name.

Such a massive change in technological capability would need government intervention to ensure that these new powers with regard to confidentiality were not abused. Different countries had different responses. In the UK, there was a perception that the newly introduced Data Protection Act (HMG, 1984, revised 1998) would ensure that personal and confidential data was not misused. This was itself a response to the earlier EU Directive (EU, 1981, revised 1995). However, the directive was created at a time when computing was almost exclusively centralised and based on mainframe computers based in a separate data processing department. At that time, smaller companies did not use computers at all.

By the 1990s, the situation had been further complicated by the use of larger mass storage devices such as CDs, and the connection of individual and LAN-based computers to the Internet contributed to creating a global information system that was completely out of control. Researchers, governments, and security product manufacturers provided plenty of evidence of the extent of information mismanagement, and the ease with which hackers could obtain information, but they were generally ignored. Smaller organisations gradually used personal computers, and some even started to link them together for processes of information sharing.

3. The Emerging Problem in Detail
As time went on, expertise was shared and solutions were generally adopted. Whilst misuse of data within an organisation was a management problem, larger companies and government departments assessed that their respective IT departments were closest to the data, and therefore best able to deal with the emerging information management problem associated with electronic data. This was to some extent ironical because it was usually the IT departments that had told their respective managements that the removal of read only centralised computing, end-user empowerment, and local storage would, without proper user training, present a security problem, and had been largely ignored. Now the problem was finally acknowledged it was left to those same departments to solve it. Of course SMEs often didn’t have an IT department, so the problem was often not addressed at all, other than a reminder about the Data Protection Act.

Around the world, governments offered different responses to the quietly acknowledged but growing problem with personal computer networks and Internet based organisational computing:

1. Legislate (but how to enforce?)
2. Educate (but who is going to pay?)
3. Offer and encourage codes of practice & regulations (again, how to enforce?)

One response was to develop a code of practice further into a process-based approach to information security, which could be certified. The carrot would be that the certificate would show evidence of good information management, improve an organization’s
reputation, and subsequently increase their customer base. The most effective standard that emerged was developed in the UK from best practice of government departments. This set of security controls and guidelines for information security processes became a British standard, known as BS7799.

### 3.1 Adoption of Information Security Standards

Although excellent for larger companies and public sector departments, it was acknowledged that BS7799 wasn't designed for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It was a very cumbersome standard, which would be expensive to develop and maintain, and beyond the financial and human resource reach of smaller organisations. Surprisingly, very little government advice was offered to these SMEs, which were rapidly growing in numbers, and providing an increasing percentage of a typical country's GDP.

Within and beyond organizations, crimes were increasingly being committed through exploitation of data. In most countries governments were reluctant to intervene, with the general mantra being let the emerging information superhighway police itself. Most of online transactions were completed with the aid of credit card numbers, and this became lucrative for credit card companies who had no wish to discourage such activities and offered compensation to consumers and businesses alike in the relatively small numbers of cases of fraud. However, as the millennium approached, and passed, information security problems continued to rise. The new academic discipline of "Economics of Information Security" emerged in response to the fact that even larger organisations weren't aware of the extent of the problem, the economic case for doing something about it, and the relative benefits of different actions to help secure organisational data.

Some countries considered a more serious view about data misuse, and introduced stricter legislation e.g. Japan, United States of America (starting with California). However, governments in most countries were reluctant to legislate in this way, probably because of fear or an organisational backlash at a time when a new market was emerging, and the cost of adequately policing any such legislation. The typical approach was to offer advice to businesses and organisations, and to recommend compliance with a security standard. Although BS7799 was popular, compliance with other standards and codes of practice such as COBIT, ITIL and ISF were (and still are) also popular, and encouraged.

Unsurprisingly, crime involving the misuse of data continued to increase throughout the 2000s decade throughout the world. The authors are based in the UK and remember newspaper headlines based on data breaches appearing on a fairly regular basis from mid-decade. Statistics available from that era showed a big rise in e-crime (as it became known), supporting the perception from the Information Security community that the information ecosystem was being exploited more and more frequently. There was a slight tightening of penalties under the Data Protection Act (DPA) towards the end of the decade, and some resources were made available to the public sector for awareness training, but that was about it.

One great hope for researchers and practitioners involved in securing the information ecosystem was the emergence in 2005 of an International Standard (ISO27001) to certify organisations that have developed a robust information security management system (ISMS). However, this was based around BS7799 and suffered from the same limitations. ISO27001 certification levels in the UK and in most countries round the world have to date
been remarkably low. One of the authors (Henson and Hallas, 2009) noted at a previous SMEs conference that the only ISO27001 hotspots emerging were in the Pacific Rim and Eastern Europe, and that pattern continues. The message for the would-be hacker is clear: target servers in a country with low take up of security standards, and poor data protection legislation, poorly policed.

The cost to the UK of all this cyber criminal activity was estimated (Detica, 2011) at £27billion. Some researchers concluded that

“The straightforward conclusion to draw on the basis of the comparative figures collected in this study is that we should perhaps spend less in anticipation of computer crime (on antivirus, firewalls etc.) but we should certainly spend an awful lot more on catching and punishing the perpetrators.”

(Moore et al, 2012)

This was an inevitable result of twenty years of essentially letting the market decide, with weak legislation poorly enforced through lack of direction or resources. At the time, the findings and conclusions of Moore, Anderson et al were not considered as helpful; from an information security perspective it was difficult to see why. However, finally, in 2016, online crime figures were included with UK National Crime Survey statistics (ONS, 2016) and it is now generally accepted that, in the UK at least, cyber crime is massive and still growing.

4. What can be done?
One obvious response would be to accept the emerging consensus and tighten up legislation, and the policing of existing legislation. After a series of passionate debates, this appears to be the approach adopted by the EU Parliament and regulations came into force earlier this year (EU, 2016) with a two year time lag before enforcement. Data Protection legislation is the domain of a data protection enforcer, rather than the police. The UK’s data protection enforcer (the Information Commissioner) was sceptical about the effectiveness of prescriptive legislation (ICO, 2013) unless massive extra resources were available and more staff employed. A new model for providing revenue to the Information Commissioner’s Office is now well under development so this state of affairs may well change soon. One complication, however, is that the UK has voted to leave the European Union, and the new legislation is unlikely to be enforced. However, the stronger enforcement of existing legislation through more and better equipped ICO staff would still be a positive outcome.

Various studies have shown that the amounts being spent on catching cyber criminals is very low compared to the cost of cyber-crime. Other studies have shown a gradual change in the behaviour of credit card companies; whilst the consumer is protected, vendors have to meet the cost of unproven fraud for themselves. The ultimate penalty for non-compliance would be to have their on-line credit card license revoked. In even quite recent research, surprisingly few SMEs were even aware of PCI-DSS (Payment Card Industry- Data Security Standard) that the regulations could impact on them. However, the latest version of PCI-DSS v3.2 (PCI, 2016) suggests that fines on SMEs for non-compliance may soon start to happen.
4.1 Addressing B2B Market Failure

As already implied, SMEs are very reluctant to engage at all with spending on information security in any consistent way. They may purchase of hardware and antivirus and related software, but not necessarily as part of a long-term strategy. Why wouldn’t UK businesses take precautions to systematically store and process data securely, especially if they got a badge for doing so? Smaller businesses must hear of all of the threats presented to them by security industry, and to the external observer it must be quite baffling why they steadfastly refuse to spend appropriately and wisely on protecting their precious data against all these threats.

The answer that SMEs are "anti-badging" is not true, because very many of them have acquired ISO9001 certification, awarded for their great efforts towards achieving good quality management systems. Perhaps the information security management badge is seen as too difficult to get, but the badge specifically designed for SMEs, Cyber Essentials (HMG, 2014), is both straightforward and inexpensive.

As reported in previous research (Henson et al, 2011), one of the authors conducted research on local (Worcestershire) businesses in an effort to find out whether a lack of appropriately priced courses that they could send their staff on was the problem, but the responses suggested that most just weren’t interested in spending time and money on steps to secure their data. Many saw it as an unnecessary additional cost that would not give them any market advantage. Others did show some concern about data breaches, but this was pre-Cyber Essentials and they were put off by high costs of getting certified to a recognizable standard like ISO27001. This environment, and possible economic drivers for changing SME behaviour, was described for an earlier paper (Henson & Hallas, 2009). It was expected at that time that the continual stream of information about data breaches would bring about a change in attitudes and higher adoption of ISO27001 in the UK. However, the research also showed that a less cumbersome system than ISO27001 would be beneficial to SMEs. More recently, a standard especially for SMEs was developed (Henson et al, 2011), which became known as IASME (Information Assurance for SMEs). Cyber Essentials arrived about three years later, in 2014.

Cyber Essentials and IASME are endorsed by UK government for encouraging the small business to develop an information security management system progressively, and at modest cost. However, the take up of both to date has been disappointing. In the authors' opinions, the best way to summarise the SME lack of interest in information security despite great efforts to change their behaviour is therefore "market failure", and steps need to be taken urgently to change the dangerously complacent attitude that still prevails (Ponemon, 2016).

As there is no rush for SMEs to adopt standards, and with the UK government only providing small amounts of financial support for awareness training, three approaches have been and are still being adopted:

1. Let the market decide what to do
2. Use supply chain hubs to get SME security in order
3. Use cyber liability insurance, coupled with discounts for achievement against a security standard
The first of these has not been successful because there is no real SME market for information assurance in the UK.

4.2 Real and Present Danger
The authors’ view is that something important can be prevented from growing through cultural norms that have emerged and are resistant to change. The “free market” is therefore not always the way forward, and there is a potential danger of market failure, which seems to have happened regarding information assurance. It is accepted among researchers and relevant professionals that there is a potential vulnerability to UK infrastructure through the supply chain. However, while the larger companies at the heart of the supply chain can (and do) spend massively on information security because they understand the risks, the SMEs in that same supply chain don’t have either the resources or the perception of information risk that the organisation at the hub of the supply chain will (or should!) have, and should have passed along the chain.

With Internet-based trading more and more common, supply chains are often becoming global, with SMEs from a number of countries involved. It only takes one of these SMEs to present vulnerability or the hackers to get potential access to the hub. The best documented example of this happening was in the US, where plans for a military aircraft design were hacked from a supply chain hub, and it turned out that a recruitment agency associated with the supply chain provided the hackers with a route in, which was duly exploited. The government responded swiftly, but pointed the finger at supply chain hubs as needing to be more responsible concerning with whom they do business, and to make sure their partners are secure against attack. However, there was no new legislation. After all, the US was already one of the best-legislated countries against data breaches, with its own data breaches law operating in most states (California, 2003).

The effects of supply chain pressure are slowly being felt, as businesses realise that to do business with particular supply chains they have to show compliance with information security management principles. Historically these have been through self-checking exercises, but indications are emerging that (particularly in the US) the expectations placed upon SMEs from an information management and security perspective are becoming more demanding. As supply chains become increasingly global, countries with a business culture that respects information security can be expected to gain more contracts than those who "let the market decide". In the UK, Cyber Essentials was encouraged and is now becoming mandatory for would-be participants in the Ministry of Defence supply chain.

4.3 Emergence of Cyber-Liability Insurance
The most influential thinker in Economics of Information Security is probably Ross Anderson, of Cambridge University, who has written dozens of papers on the subject, and jointly founded WEIS (Workshop in Economics of Information Security) in 2001 with another prolific thinker and writer, Bruce Schneier. However, long before he produced “Why information security is hard – an economic perspective” (Anderson, 2001), the seminal paper that inspired WEIS, Ross had said:

“A trusted component or system is one which you can insure.” (Anderson, 1994)

Cyber Insurance featured regularly at the annual WEIS conferences. Henson & Hallas,
2009, identified insurance premium levels as one of six possible business drivers for security spending (the other five being compliance with laws & regulations, protection of brand and reputation, the physical cost of a breach, market pressure for a standard, and stock market price). At that time there was only very limited choice of insurance in the UK, and aimed at a very limited market. The cybersecurity market was not understood at all by buyers or sellers.

Throughout many years, the offer of insurance has been successful in making a breakthrough in cases of perceived market failure, and it made perfect sense for insurance companies to devise products that would be attractive to organisations concerned about the costs of a data breach. As already mentioned, the UK seems to be well behind the leading-edge countries in terms of all things cyber security, and insurance products are only just starting to emerge; in other parts of the world, over 10 years ago, innovative products were being developed for secure institutions based on an acceptance of the impossibility of total security, and providing some recompense in the unlikely case of such a breach (Siegel et al, 2002). A framework for more widespread cyber security liability insurance soon followed (Gordon, Loeb, et al, 2003). Soon afterwards, in a groundbreaking paper, an academic asked the question

“… is there a business model for insurance companies to offer coverage against damage caused by worms and hackers at acceptable premiums?” (Bohme, 2005)

This author also suggests that an organisation even looking at Cybersecurity insurance as an educational exercise will get people thinking about security of data with greater focus, and therefore may start the process of counteracting the market failure. A number of other papers at that time reported more overtly on the same theme (Kasen et al, 2004, 2005).

The author of the paper quoted above also proposed a model for cyber liability pricing based on an assessment of actual security risks within the organisation. Whether this paper provided the precipitation framework, or whether it had become part of the zeitgeist, including the aforementioned data breaches legislation, within a short space of time many cyber-liability products were being offered to businesses within the competitive market place of the US. However, assessment of the business for suitability for cyber liability insurance was time-consuming, and an automated assessment tool was sought to make the job a lot quicker and more efficient.

4.4 Information Security Standards and Cyber-Liability Insurance

All this had happened in the US long before the IASME was anything beyond blue sky thinking, let alone commercially available as an alternative to ISO27001, PCI-DSS, COBIT and other security-related standards. The increasingly widespread availability of cyber liability insurance in the US brought about Bohme’s predicted effect and helped to influence the status of ISO27001 in that country as insurers significantly reduced premiums for companies that had achieved this standard. In the mid-2000s, a number of research papers emerged that suggested the insurance could play a part in improving cyber security awareness. An excellent analysis of AIG's Net Advantage product was undertaken by Bohme and a US based colleague at Carnegie-Mellon (Bohme & Kataria, 2006). A proposal for enhancement followed with their suggestion of an "equilibrium model" to
provide information for the cyber-insurance market. Particular types of business were identified as being most appropriate as early adopters for cyber-insurance. Judging by the subsequent success of AIG in the cybersecurity insurance market, it seems likely that the results of this academic collaboration were used wisely.

There is no doubt that US organisations today are much more “risk aware” now than hitherto, and much more prepared to spend to improve their information security. One reason for this change is cited as the progressive roll out of new laws (State of California, 2003; US Federal Government, 2002) and the original PCI regulations (PCI Security Standards Council LLC, 2008), which have obviously increased awareness. Also, as a result of incidents within the US Defense supply chain (US Government, 2010) there has also been a change in requirements for US government and other supply chain contracts (Whitehouse, 2011), and businesses have started to find that they are required to show evidence of insurance cover for information assets in order to get business. The US growth of cyber liability insurance helped by making information security a mainstream topic for conversation, and a necessary precursor for information assurance to achieve acceptability in the SME market place.

5. Using Insurance to influence UK SME Cyber Security

The research conducted on UK SMEs regarding information security is at least consistent, if not understood. Most SMEs do not see it is a priority, and are therefore unlikely to spend on it, so market failure does seem an appropriate description. However, a small but growing minority are concerned about their information security, do worry about a data breach, and do see tightening up information security as one of their priorities looking forward. These will be currently considering Cyber Essentials, even if they haven’t got round to it yet!

This latter group is important because they can influence others by what they say and do. As previously stated, the mere act of getting cyber liability insurance into the marketplace raises its profile, and could make a difference to the zeitgeist. The UK does not benefit from powerful legislative drivers for business attitudes to change, and that leaves just the supply chain hubs and cyber liability insurance providers to act as the change agents. Of course the insurance companies could be regarded as supply chain hubs in their own right, so getting one of these on board is crucial. Thanks to the efforts of Duncan Sutcliffe & Co., one of the insurance companies involved in the US research and roll out of cyber security insurance, AIG, became involved in the new UK cyber liability market.

Supply chain pressure often brings about change. A good example is the requirement in the construction industry for some kind of reassurance against data breach, and now all construction contracts include a clause about insurance cover. Other supply chain pressure is starting to emerge through public sector procurement requirements. Sutcliffe noticed that some business contracts in the UK were now requiring some sort of reassurance about protecting information assets and compensation in the event of a data breach to protect their supply chains. Interestingly, evidence suggests that the UK policyholders are more concerned about 1st party claims than 3rd party claims. In the US it was the fear of 3rd party claims that fuelled the growth of the cyber liability insurance market.

Cyber liability insurance is an obvious way to provide that reassurance to SMEs. Also,
contracts could reflect security of data concerns as more lawyers developed specific knowledge of the laws relating to data breaches and cyber security, and started to word contract requirements accordingly. As reality sinks in, there have been recent signs (Holmes, 2013) that, with continued concern about a lack of an effective enforcement policy to catch e-criminals, insurance is being seen as the next best thing for protecting assets. Cyber Liability Insurance was certainly becoming a matter for discussion by 2013 and articles such as (Sambhi, 2013) helped generate further momentum.

Insurance companies want to insure “good bets” (i.e. those who are less likely to claim), as the market starts to mature, insurance companies are starting to ask those applying for insurance if they hold a recognised assurance standard on their proposal form / questionnaire. Holding a certificate can lead to favourable terms. They are also promoting assurance standards such as cyber essentials (e.g. Allianz) and giving incentives to get certified (e.g. CFC underwriting)

Finally, the proposed tightening of EU Data Protection legislation, which will finally become EU Law in 2018 (EU, 2016), is likely to bring about a big rise in insurance to protect information assets in countries where this will be enforced. All of these factors are impinging on the business community at the same time, and create the right climate for a change of business attitudes. Hence, our new model, which was first put forward in an earlier conference paper (Henson r & Sutcliffe D, 2013).

5.1 The Model
An important part of any product marketing is to offer incentives to the buyer, and the insurance industry does this through offering reductions based on a history of “good behaviour”. Car insurance premiums are lower for "good drivers". One measurement of being a "good driver" is a lack of recent accidents and consequent claims, and zero penalty points on the drivers licence. What constitutes good information management, and how can this be demonstrated? One way a business can do this is to by getting certified against a recognised and appropriate (for their business) information security standard. It was acknowledged, however, that UK SMEs would be very unlikely that would wish to become involved with a cyber security insurance product specifying ISO 27001, for reasons previously discussed. The new standards aimed at SMEs that had recently emerged, IASME and Cyber Essentials, would be more appropriate tools for insurance companies to measure “good cyber behaviour”.

Sutcliffe discussed possibilities for AIG involvement in the UK, where attitudes to cyber liability insurance had recently become more favourable. The cyber liability offering to businesses had been developed in the US over a number of years and was fairly comprehensive in terms of the protection it afforded. The assessment process for a business was based on a series of "self-check" information security questions, and the responses were taken in good faith by the insurance company to be correct. The areas that needed to be covered have also been refined over many years so that the range of protection covers typical business needs.

The possibly contentious area, at least as far as some security professionals is the use of self-assessment. If the business lies, and then gets breached, won't they get insurance under false pretences. The developers of IASME were firmly in this camp. Indeed, previous
requests for a self-certification version of IASME had been resisted on grounds that an auditing model for assessment was the only safe basis for certification. However, as the IASME team discovered, insurance is different. It has been around a long time, since the early ships set out on voyages across the seven seas. Yes, some people do lie, but insurers are well aware of that. Where the "back end" of insurance infrastructure kicks in, is when the customer makes a claim. If any of the questions have been answered inaccurately (and robust checks are made!) the customer won't get their claim paid.

In cyber liability insurance, this is a safeguard for the assessment where the insurance model is concerned; the further process that comes into play if a claim is made will reveal the lies (or misunderstandings?) in any of the original responses given to get the insurance in the first place. If the responses are found not to be truthful the insurer reserves the right to withhold compensation. In the light of this new information, the IASME team agreed to reengineer IASME to be self-certified... but a "self-assessed" certificate would initially only be issued for insurance purposes!

5.2 Information Assurance as Actuarial Tool for UK Insurers

AIG underwriters looked closely at IASME compared to the 20 or more "tick box" questions they normally ask. A further advantage of IASME as opposed to a traditional tick-box approach is that information risk is an essential component of the process, and SMEs are required to scrutinise their existing systems or areas that could be considered as low, medium, or high risk. This is useful information for insurers, and can help the SME focus resources most appropriately to achieve an acceptable overall area of risk that the insurer would be comfortable to insure.

Cyber Essentials has been available since 2014. To date, only one Cyber Essentials awarding body in the UK offers insurance in conjunction with achieving the Cyber Essentials badge, and that is IASME. It may be significant that IASME are also the awarding body that has provided the most certificates. Is that because although companies don’t want information assurance, they do want the combination of assurance & insurance?

5.3 Engaging SMEs with the model

IASME were continually asked for a simple, cheap self-assessment tool by small businesses, as a first stage towards developing their own ISMS, and the insurance model enabled this to happen, with the understanding that only self-certification provided was not the IASME-approved process, and could only be used for their own internal processes and for insurance purposes, which carried their own safeguards.

The opportunity to develop a self-certified version of IASME led to a trial with some local SMEs, and the results were encouraging. This service has subsequently been offered more broadly to SMEs, again with the proviso that the results are only used for internal purposes or for insurance purposes. IASME certification with the IASME badge is based on auditing, and the distinction needs to be clear. However, SMEs can otherwise be put off even applying or cyber liability insurance if they know there is to be a test of some kind, and the fact that there is a local standard coupled with the assessment process may reassure them,
and encourage them to participate. Apart from the potential attractions of IASME and Cyber Essentials, the engagement (or not) of SMEs depends on the ability of AIG and rival insurers to create a market in an area that has rightly been associated with market failure. The AIG product was only launched in February 2013, and IASME itself is only used by a small number of SMEs. Both IASME and Cyber liability insurance are getting exposure in the media, and it is anticipated that there will at least be some interest from potential early adopters worried about their information assets and in need of piece of mind. Of course, as previously stated, there are many good economic reasons for SMEs tightening up on security and once a market starts to emerge all these factors can be given an airing.

When one of the authors started out on this daunting journey to improve SME security, the words of Mahatma Gandhi came to mind:

“First they ignore you, then they ridicule you, then they fight you, and then you win.”

Plenty regarded the task of engaging SMEs with systematic and auditable information security as laughably difficult, but information assurance for SMEs does now seem to be in the serious phase, with UK government interest in offering something to SMEs as part of their Cyber Security Strategy (HMG, 2011).

5.4 Effect on SME Attitudes to Cyber Security

As already stated, it is early days for this new model. The IASME team have been working for a number of years with SMEs with the goal of improving their security processes, and it has to be said that success to date has been limited. Looking at the history of the growth of distributed computing, and the lack of education and understanding over many years at all levels, it is entirely understandable that SMEs think all is OK, and that the security horrors presented are mostly hype to get them to buy security products. In the absence of tighter legislation, a change in behaviour will only change with a change in attitude. There is evidence that availability of cyber liability insurance has influenced SME attitudes in the US, so it is not unreasonably to expect a similar effect in the UK. But changes in attitude take time.

The numbers of SMEs seeking certification via IASME or any of the other potential standards available to them are being carefully monitored. The last time such a survey was undertaken at University of Worcester, the results showed very little engagement with standards. A further survey on attitudes in 2015 (Henson & Garfield, 2016), as cyber liability insurance became increasingly available at a competitive price, did show a more generalised shift, but not yet in favour of information assurance. As already stated, there are suggestions that the impending change in the law will bring about a more rapid attitudinal change. The contrary argument, that previous changes to the law had little effect, can be counteracted by a perception backed up by research that the law was not realistically policeable with the allocated resources. Even though UK cyber crime figures are now open and transparent, there is no indication from UK government that more resourcing will become available for enforcing the new law when it become statute, so this state of affairs seems set to continue.
Against this backdrop, with concern continuing to increase, insurance is certain to become a potential solution, as it has been for some against criminal activity against physical assets in the home. This will only start to influence attitudes as the market develops, and insurance companies are seen to be in direct competition to get SME business insuring their information assets. The existence of that competitive market will certainly cause businesses to talk about the subject because it will offer them (if the price is right...) an affordable solution. The suggestion so far (from the AIG product recently launched in the UK) is that the price is competitive, and offers SMEs a wide range of safeguards for information assets.

However, SMEs do not part with their money easily. It is taking longer than expected, and one suspects that there will be a slow, reluctant acceptance, and increased awareness coupled with enhanced legislation and supply chain requirements, will cause a permanent shift in SME attitudes. Recently, a move by the UK government to make information assurance certification a compulsory part of contracts / procurement has increased the uptake of certification, although from a low base level. Also, so called cyber enabled crime (e.g. online invoice fraud) has increased interest in insurance and such crimes are often not covered by a cyber insurance policy, which creates further discussion regarding cyber security practice. All these are welcome changes in a previously “failed” market.

6. Conclusions

In the US, Cyber Liability insurance has been effective in helping to raise awareness about organisational information security, and has created a lucrative market for the insurers. It is early days for this type of insurance in the UK; a product that works in the US does not necessarily work in the quite different culture of the UK. However, most UK insurers do seem to be looking at introducing their own products so it seems that changes are definitely underway. The progress of these new products is of interest to information security researchers because it opens up a new flank in creating a market for information security certification amongst small businesses. Some argue that the requirements of insurance companies are already forcing policyholders to improve their levels of cyber security and / or achieve standards.

As this paper is written, implementation of a cyber liability model for SMEs is still in its infancy. The offer of insurance will not have much impact on those SMEs who don’t worry about a data breach, let alone think about its costs. However, even if UK law is not about to change, the GDPR law has already been introduced across the EU (EU, 2016a). The politics of Brexit (Dorling, 2016) are beyond the scope of this research paper but the Single Digital Market (SDM) which is being rolled out across the EU (EU, 2016b) is already internationally influential, and with UK still part of the EU for the time being, UK-based companies would be foolish to ignore it. A basic tenet of SDM is the new European GDPR legislation. Judging by the large numbers of seminars for business being offered on this topic around the UK, it seems that there is sufficient curiosity and response to create an interest and talking point; previously trying to get the average SME owner interested in information security was an almost impossible task.

Through careful use of this model with motivated SMEs, allied with the slow change in attitudes that is happening as cyber crime figures continue to increase, there seems an opportunity for a greater influence on SME attitudes, and potential for developing a market where according to some commentators it had previously ceased to exist. It is to be hoped
that a win-win scenario will follow. With cyber security awareness and actions by SMEs dramatically improved, the market for information assurance anticipated by the UK government with the introduction of Cyber Essentials (HMG, 2014) will become a reality.

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